Game Theoretic Analysis of the Feedback Loop Caused by Widely Available Computer Estimation on Market Values
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https://doi.org/10.32473/flairs.37.1.135528关键词:
Game Theory, agent-based model, Prediction摘要
Public availability of computer generated predictions can change the markets and its impact is here investigated with a game theoretic approach.
Real estate inflation is not a new phenomenon but its consistent and almost monotonous persistence over unusually many years, coinciding with new prominence of public estimation information from successful Mass Real Estate Estimators (\MREE{}) already caused various independent research organizations to investigate potential links.
What we model is a repetitive theoretical game between the MREEs and the home owners, where each player has secret information and expertise.
In contrast to competing results, for our model and simulations a restriction of MREE-style price estimation availability to opt-in properties may help partially reduce an inflationary pressure.
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