

ATTITUDES, CAUSES AND PERCEPTIONS: THE 1980 BLACK RIOT IN DADE COUNTY (MIAMI), FLORIDA

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In May 1980, Dade County gained the unenviable distinction of becoming the first large U.S. metropolitan area to experience a major racial disturbance during the 1980s. This was not the first racial disorder in Miami. In August 1968, a black riot occurred that was one of the last in a round of racial disorders that characterized large American cities during the late 1960s (Salter and Mings 1969). The 1980 riot, however, was significantly more destructive and deadly than the 1968 disturbance. In 1968, the result was several hundred thousands of dollars worth of property damage and three deaths. In 1980, the damage amounted to about one hundred million dollars and eighteen deaths (Figs. 1 and 2). In fact, the 1980 riot was more expensive (in dollars unstandardized for inflation) than any other single urban social disorder in U.S. history (Ten most costly... 1980).


This paper intends (1) to identify the areas where most of the 1980 disturbances occurred and to sketch the background characteristics of the people involved; (2) to present some of the causes for this riot; and (3) to discuss some of the findings of an attitudinal survey conducted by *The Miami Herald* in 1981 with the assistance of the authors of this paper.

Location and Background Characteristics

Like most large southern cities, Metropolitan Miami contains a number of well-defined and clearly distinct areas of black concentration (Fig. 1) (Rose 1971, 8-9, 19-22). Because of this dispersion, the 1980 disturbances were not restricted to one area and thus were more difficult to control. They were most prevalent in poor central city locations, such as in Brownsville-Liberty City (which contains about 35 percent of all the county's blacks), the Central District (also called Overtown), Coconut Grove, and Opa-Locka. Very little trouble occurred in the more affluent suburban communities such as Richmond Heights, Perrine, and Goulds. Within the central city concentrations, most of the death and destruction occurred along major transportation arteries, where there was more traffic and business activity (Fig. 2) (Browning 1980, 17A).

The disadvantaged situation of blacks in metropolitan Miami in 1980 is illustrated clearly by their demographic and social characteristics. For instance, in 1979 the age-adjusted death rate (deaths per 100,000 population) for all of Dade County was 560, while for Liberty City it was 1,128. The comparable figure for all United States blacks was 798. The median age at death for Liberty City was 61.9 years, whereas for the rest of Dade County it was 74.2 years. In 1980 the homicide rate (deaths per 100,000 population) was 37.6 for Dade County and 113.6 for Liberty City. In 1980 Dade County had the highest doctor/patient ratio (263 physicians per 100,000 population) of all major U.S. metropolitan areas. However, the ratio for Liberty City was only about one-fifth of that. In fact, the doctor/patient ratio was lower for Liberty City than it was for twenty-two Latin American countries. In 1979 the teenage birth rate (births per 1,000 females aged 10-19) for Dade County whites was 16.2; for non-whites it was 71.4. One indicator of the weakness of family solidarity is the percentage of out-of-wedlock births. In 1979 this figure was about 9 percent for the U.S. white population, whereas for U.S. blacks it was 55 percent


MAJOR BLACK RESIDENTIAL AREAS IN METROPOLITAN MIAMI



Source: David B. Longbrake and Woodrow W. Nichols, Jr.,
Miami: Sunshine and Shadows (Cambridge, Mass.:
Ballinger Publishing Company, 1976), p. 48.

Figure 1

HOMICIDES AND REPORTED FIRES IN AREA



- Location of fires
- ①②③④⑤⑥⑦⑧⑨⑩⑪⑫⑬⑭⑮⑯⑰⑱ Location of deaths in order of occurrence

Source: The Miami Herald, Monday, May 19, 1980, p. 17A.

Figure 2

(Reid 1982, 12), and for Liberty City it was almost 75 percent (Malone 1981).

Although millions of dollars were expended following the 1968 riots to upgrade the quality of life in Miami's poor black areas, evidently not enough was done to satisfy the growing aspirations of the population. In fact, by 1980 most blacks felt that conditions had been deteriorating rather than improving. Evidence of this perception is provided by two surveys conducted by *The Miami Herald* immediately after the 1968 and 1980 disturbances. In all cases, the perception of blacks was that problems had increased and that their neighborhood and country was less inviting than formerly (Table 1).

TABLE 1
BLACK PERCEPTIONS, 1968 AND 1980

Attitude Indicator	Percent of blacks perceiving problems		Change
	1968	1980	
Unemployment is a problem	50%	95%	90%
Police brutality is a problem	23%	90%	291%
Poor housing is a problem	59%	89%	51%
Want to continue to live in neighborhood	55%	37%	-33%
U.S. is worth fighting for	80%	52%	-35%

Source: Morin 1980.

Causes of the 1980 Riot

The 1968 *Miami Herald* survey found that Dade County blacks felt that the three biggest problems faced were: (1) too many children dropping out of school; (2) dirty neighborhoods; and (3) parents who do not control their children. Although it might be a mistake to infer from these results that there was no dissatisfaction with Dade County society as a whole, it is interesting to note that the three issues given the greatest emphasis were largely problems internal to the black community. That is, it appears blacks were concerned with problems that, with improved internal organization, could be controlled with a minimum of support from outside the black community. Twelve years later, however, attitudes had changed. The 1980 *Herald* survey indicated that blacks felt their three major problems were: (1) unemployment; (2) police brutality; and, (3) inadequate housing. These are external issues. To a major extent, their solution lies outside the black community because: (1) most blacks have white employers; (2) the majority of police are not black; and, (3) much black housing is owned and/or operated by whites (Morin 1980).

When asked to indicate the major reasons for the 1980 riot, blacks found a racially-discriminating justice system as the major culprit. Considerable evidence exists to support this perception. For instance, in January 1979, a white police officer, Willis T. Jones, sexually molested an eleven-year old black girl. After admitting guilt, he was sentenced to three years probation (Buchanan 1980). In February 1979, five white police officers broke into the house of a black school teacher, Nathaniel LaFleur, and beat him in a case of mistaken identity while looking for a narcotics suspect. No charges were filed and a

grand jury found that, although the deputies were negligent, no laws were broken (Thompson 1979). In April 1980, Dade County's highest-ranking black official, Johnny Jones, the superintendent of the county school system, was convicted of second degree grand theft for using public funds for personal use (Savage and McGee 1980). In December 1979, a black insurance executive, Arthur McDuffie, was accused of running a red light on his motorcycle. He died while being apprehended. The police involved contended that he died in a crash while he was trying to evade them. An investigation revealed that there had been no crash, that McDuffie had been beaten by the police and that these officers later attempted to cover up the incident. Six white officers were charged and four were brought to trial. An all-white jury acquitted them on May 17, 1980, the day the riot began (Five men become symbols 1980). The newspaper poll found that 71 percent of blacks listed the McDuffie incident, 36 percent suggested an unfair justice system, 28 percent listed the Johnny Jones verdict, and 21 percent indicated the lack of job opportunities as the cause of the 1980 riot (Results of the *Herald's* 1980 poll... 1980).

The concern with black unemployment, mentioned often as a major reason for the 1980 riots, is probably best explained by the *blocked opportunities model* of riot producing stresses. This theory argues that blacks have been excluded systematically from full participation in American society by white-controlled economic institutions (Adams 1972). This can be accomplished by overt racial discrimination, but often is more subtly blamed on low education and skill levels. The location of many jobs outside the black residential areas also diminishes employment opportunities since such jobs are often inaccessible to those without automobiles.

In addition to the problems with the justice system and unemployment cited by the blacks themselves in the 1980 *Miami Herald* survey, two additional factors should be mentioned as causes of the 1980 riot: (1) the housing squeeze; and, (2) relative deprivation. The housing squeeze faced by Dade County blacks is of increasing concern. Between 1960 and 1980, Liberty City's population declined from 80,000 to approximately 66,000, but the number of available housing units decreased even more drastically. Many older units have been condemned, abandoned, and bulldozed and have not been replaced because of a lack of financing, high insurance rates, low rent-paying abilities of the local residents, and the fear of another riot (especially for buildings owned by whites) (Tasker 1981a). Thus by 1980, about one-third of Liberty City families lived in overcrowded housing units (defined as those with more than one person per room). A recent study by the U.S. Bureau of the Census has determined that between 1950 and 1980 the dwelling loss rate for black households has been 2.5 times that of white households in the United States. Black housing is more likely to be removed from the housing stock because their residences are often located in central city areas where housing is older and more likely to be dilapidated and of deteriorating quality (Dahmann 1982, 14). Thus, the Liberty City situation appears to be part of a national trend that has affected a housing squeeze on many poor central city blacks.

Probably the best general explanation of black dissatisfaction in the riot areas of metropolitan Miami is provided by the model of *progressive relative deprivation* (Adams 1972). This model implies that although a group's living conditions may be improving, aspirations are rising even more quickly. As the gap between capabilities and expectations increases, levels of satisfaction decline, even though in an absolute sense quality of life improves. There is evidence that some of the social and economic conditions for blacks were improving in Dade County before the 1980 riots. For instance, their unemployment rate dropped from 15.7 to 9.3 percent between 1977 and 1979. The number of blacks who were registered to vote increased by 68 percent between 1968 and 1980. The number of black-owned businesses rose from 310 to 380 between 1969 and 1977. Between 1977 and 1979 the percentage of blacks who passed Florida's

functional literacy examination rose from 75 to 90 percent; while the percentage passing the mathematics exam doubled from 23 to 46 percent. Still, these levels were well below those achieved by Dade County whites. In fact, in many respects the gap between blacks and whites increased between 1970 and 1984 (Sizing up black progress... 1980; Porter and Dunn 1984).

1981 Attitudinal Survey

In February 1981, an attitudinal survey of black and white relations in Dade County was conducted by *The Miami Herald* with the assistance of the authors of this paper. The purpose was to ascertain racial attitudes and perceptions nine months after the riot of May 1980, once the initial emotionalism had abated. Telephone interviews using random digit dialing were conducted with 1,021 persons: 431 from throughout Dade County, 206 from Richmond Heights, and 384 from Liberty City.⁽¹⁾ Richmond Heights is a black (92.6 percent) middle class suburban enclave located in southern Dade County (Fig. 1). Its residents were expected to exhibit attitudes at variance with the attitudes of the predominantly poor and black population of Liberty City due to differences in socioeconomic status. In addition, both these areas were expected to exhibit different attitudes from those expressed by the all-of-Dade-County sample because of ethnic and socioeconomic differences. The latter sample was 13.4 percent black, 32.2 percent Latin, 48.2 percent non-Latin white, and 6.1 percent "other." Fifty-two questions were asked, covering demographic, socioeconomic, and attitudinal characteristics.⁽²⁾ The three samples were weighted so as to reflect the age and sex structure of the populations from which they were drawn (as given in the 1980 census). The answers to seven questions are discussed below. The major purpose is to examine differences in attitudes and perceptions between the populations of Dade County as a whole, a middle class black suburb (Richmond Heights) and a poor black inner city area (Liberty City).

The first question asked if the program to rebuild Liberty City after the 1980 riot was a "good thing," or, rather, a "reward" to the rioters (Table 2). Shortly after the riots the Governor of Florida and local business leaders proposed a 1 percent increase in the state sales tax to raise \$100 million to rebuild Liberty City. The State Legislature refused to adopt the proposal because many legislators argued that this would be a reward for rioting. This question was designed to examine the extent to which this feeling prevailed among the three Dade County sample populations. The highest percentage (71 percent) of those indicating that the plans to rebuild the riot areas were a "good thing" occurred in the Liberty City sample. This area had been most directly affected by the disorders and probably would benefit the most by a rebuilding program. The Richmond Heights sample (with 67 percent agreeing that it would be beneficial to rebuild the destroyed areas) is not significantly different from Liberty City ($\alpha = < .01$) because many of these people once lived in Liberty City and/or have relatives and friends currently living there. For the total Dade County sample, only 48 percent thought that government programs to rebuild Liberty City were a "good thing." When this sample is separated into its two primary ethnic components, 55 percent of Latins favored rebuilding, whereas only 38 percent of the non-Latin whites said this would be beneficial (Tasker 1981b). Therefore, it appears that the Latins were somewhat more sympathetic to the Liberty City blacks than were the non-Latin whites.

The second question asked respondents if they felt that Liberty City is "being fixed up again as quickly as possible" (Table 3). The greatest percentage (70 percent) of disagreement was found in the Liberty City sample: these people were most inconvenienced by the disorders and are most anxious to see

the damage repaired. Little difference existed between the Dade County sample (48 percent) and Richmond Heights (54 percent) sample. A slightly larger percentage of the Richmond Heights sample both agree and disagree with the statement, whereas a larger percentage of the county respondents answered "do not know."

TABLE 2
Responses to Question One*

Response	County		Richmond Heights		Liberty City	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Good Thing..	206	48.1	137	66.5	267	70.6
Reward.....	147	34.3	29	14.1	57	15.1
Don't Know..	75	17.5	40	19.4	54	14.3
Total.....	428	100.0	206	100.0	378	100.0

Chi Square = 63.0, Alpha = .00

Source: Miami Herald Survey, 1981.

*Question: Some people think government programs to rebuild Miami's Liberty City area after last May's troubles are a good thing, and others think they are just rewarding rioters. Which comes closest to your thinking -- that they're a good thing, or just a reward to rioters?

TABLE 3
Responses to Question Two*

Response	County		Richmond Heights		Liberty City	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Agree.....	122	28.8	69	33.7	96	25.1
Disagree....	201	47.5	110	53.7	269	70.2
Don't Know..	100	23.6	26	12.7	18	4.7
Total.....	423	100.0	205	100.0	383	100.0

Chi Square = 75.9; Alpha = .00

Source: Miami Herald Survey, 1981.

*The black areas that were damaged during the troubles last May are being fixed up again as quickly as possible. Do you agree or disagree with this statement?

TABLE 4

Responses to Question Three*

Response	County		Richmond Heights		Liberty City	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Agree.....	41	9.5	37	18.0	59	15.4
Disagree....	380	88.2	162	78.6	315	82.0
Don't Know..	10	2.3	7	3.4	10	2.6
Total.....	431	100.0	206	100.0	384	100.0

Chi Square = 11.7; Alpha = .07

Source: Miami Herald Survey, 1981.

*Question: Blacks who get ahead can only do it by fighting for their rights in the streets. Do you agree or disagree with this statement?

TABLE 5

Responses to Question Four*

Response	County		Richmond Heights		Liberty City	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Agree.....	124	28.8	133	64.6	301	78.3
Disagree....	256	59.4	48	23.3	54	14.1
Don't Know..	51	11.8	25	12.1	29	7.6
Total.....	431	100.0	206	100.0	384	100.0

Chi Square = 229.3, Alpha = .00

Source: Miami Herald Survey, 1981.

*Question: It's almost impossible for a black to get a fair trial in Dade County. Do you agree or disagree with this statement?

The third statement suggested that "blacks who get ahead can only do it by fighting for their rights in the streets" (Table 4). In all three samples, the vast majority disagreed, but the largest disagreement (88 percent) occurred in the county sample. The next largest percentage of disagreement (82 percent) was found in the Liberty City sample. Statistically, the percentage for the Rich-

mond Heights sample (79 percent) is not significantly lower ($\alpha \leq .01$) than that for Liberty City. It is also relevant to note that the attitudes of Liberty City residents have changed notably between 1980 and 1981. The 1980 *Herald* riot survey found that only 64 percent disagreed, whereas the 1981 figure was 82 percent (Tasker 1981b).⁽³⁾

The fourth statement suggested "that it's almost impossible for a black to get a fair trial in Dade County" (Table 5). Nearly 60 percent of the county respondents disagreed with this statement. On the other hand, almost two-thirds (65 percent) of the Richmond Heights sample and over three-quarters (78 percent) of the Liberty City respondents agreed with it. It is well known that those of lower income have higher conviction rates because they cannot afford good legal counsel. The majority of Liberty City residents are both black and poor, whereas the majority of Richmond Heights residents are black, but not poor. The socioeconomic difference explains the larger percentage of agreement with the fair trial statement in Liberty City.

The fifth question asked if the respondents were "more in favor of black progress today (1981) than they were last year at this time (before the riot), less in favor, or about the same" (Table 6). The vast majority (83 percent) of all three samples indicated they either felt the same or were more in favor of black progress. The largest percentage (50 percent) of those more in favor occurred among the Richmond Heights respondents. The largest percent (21 percent) of those less in favor was found for the Liberty City sample. This result was probably influenced by the fact that more Liberty City residents were directly impacted by the rioting.

The sixth question asked if respondents agreed with the idea that "the situation of the average man is worse, not better" (Table 7). When collectively considered, 72 percent indicated that things are getting worse. This pessimistic view follows on the heels of a tumultuous period between 1978 and 1981 when South Florida experienced a number of unsettling events in addition to the May riot, such as: rising crime and homicide rates, rapid inflation, skyrocketing housing prices and interest rates, increasing drug traffic, rising unemployment, and the uncontrolled immigration of illegal aliens (Kelly 1981). Although whites were also affected by these conditions, they were less adversely affected than blacks. Thus, it is somewhat surprising that there is no statistically significant difference between the county sample (68 percent) which was largely composed of whites, and the Liberty City sample (72 percent) of predominantly blacks. When the Richmond Heights (48 percent) and Liberty City samples are compared, the Richmond Heights respondents were significantly more pessimistic ($\alpha \leq .01$), even though they generally enjoyed higher socioeconomic status. Perhaps due to the economic recession that characterized this period, the higher aspirations of middle class Richmond Heights blacks were not fully attained. If blacks in Liberty City had lower aspiration levels this might account for their somewhat lower level of disappointment. This explanation is consistent with the model of progressive relative deprivation mentioned earlier. Another explanation may be that Richmond Heights residents, because of their higher education levels and greater accessibility, were more aware of the adverse situation in Dade County and the United States than were Liberty City residents.

Finally, Table 8 shows the results of a question in which respondents were asked if they "would move out of Dade County because they don't like the changes that have occurred." The Liberty City sample had the highest rate of agreement (48 percent), although this percentage is not significantly higher than the percentage for the county sample ($\alpha \leq .01$). Since Liberty City blacks are the poorest and most disadvantaged of the three samples, this finding is reasonable. On the other hand, a significantly higher percentage (43 percent) of the county sample would like to leave the area than was the case for the Richmond Heights sample (31 percent). This finding may reflect the

TABLE 6

Responses to Question Five*

Response	County		Richmond Heights		Liberty City	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
More in Favor....	130	30.3	103	50.0	170	44.4
Less in Favor....	50	11.7	7	3.4	81	21.1
Same.....	228	53.1	93	45.1	122	31.9
Don't Know..	21	4.9	3	1.5	10	2.6
Total.....	429	100.0	206	100.0	383	100.0

Chi Square = 83.6, Alpha = .00

Source: Miami Herald Survey, 1981.

*Question: Do you think you are more in favor of black progress today than you were last year at this time, less in favor, or about the same?

TABLE 7

Responses to Question Six*

Response	County		Richmond Heights		Liberty City	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Agree.....	293	68.1	164	79.6	273	71.7
Disagree....	109	25.3	30	14.6	91	23.9
Don't Know..	28	6.5	12	5.8	17	4.5
Total.....	430	100.0	206	100.0	381	100.0

Chi Square = 12.1, Alpha = .06

Source: Miami Herald Survey, 1981.

*Question: In spite of what some people say, the situation of the average man is getting worse, not better.

dissatisfaction many non-Latin whites often express with the changing ethnic structure of Dade County over the past twenty-three years. Between 1970 and 1980, the non-Latin white population declined by 25,000 as a result of out-migration, while the black and Hispanic populations increased. In 1950, approximately 83 percent of the county's population was composed of non-Latin whites,

TABLE 8

Responses to Question Seven*

Response	County		Richmond Heights		Liberty City	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Agree.....	87	43.3	28	31.1	77	48.4
Disagree.....	107	53.2	57	63.3	75	47.2
Don't Know..	7	3.5	5	5.6	7	4.4
Total.....	201	100.0	90	100.0	159	100.0

Chi Square = 8.4, Alpha = .21

Source: Miami Herald Survey, 1981.

*Question: Please tell me if you agree or disagree with this statement: If it were practical, I would move out of Dade County because I don't like the changes that have occurred.

only 4 percent was Hispanic, and 13 percent was black (Metropolitan Dade County Planning... 1979). In the 1980 census, the Hispanic percentage rose to 36 percent, and the black proportion increased to 17 percent. For the first time, the population of Dade County was less than one-half non-Latin white (46 percent) (Metropolitan Dade County Planning... 1982). Largely as a result of the refugee wave from Cuba shortly after the 1980 census, by 1985 the number of Hispanics had surpassed that of non-Latin whites. Current estimates are that Dade County's population is approximately 42 percent Latin, 40 percent non-Latin white, and 18 percent black (Metropolitan Dade County Planning... 1986).

It is clear from this discussion of the attitudes toward the statements reported in Tables 2 through 8 that there are significant differences in some of the attitudes of the Dade County, Richmond Heights, and Liberty City populations.⁽⁴⁾ When this study was initiated it was hypothesized that, due to its racial and economic characteristics, Richmond Heights residents would exhibit attitudes that would be intermediate between those of Dade County and Liberty City. However, such was the case for only two of the seven statements analyzed. It may be that a confounding factor is that Liberty City directly felt the detrimental effects of the riot, whereas the residents in Richmond Heights and most of the rest of Dade County did not. Had the topic of study been something that none of the three populations had experienced in a significantly different way, the original hypothesis might have been closer to the truth.

Riot Postscript

Steps to Improve Conditions

Soon after the 1980 riot a flurry of activity occurred in an attempt to ameliorate some of the problems in Miami's black neighborhoods. The Administra-

tion of President Carter promised \$83.1 million in aid, although less than \$50 million was actually received. Some of the money went unclaimed because black businessmen found it difficult to meet eligibility requirements. The initial approach was to use federal government money channeled through local county, city, and neighborhood agencies. With the Reagan Administration, the funding of social programs, including employment training, food stamps, and mental health counseling was reduced. The State of Florida also cut back its contributions. In 1981 the state sent \$1.8 million to Dade County as seed money for eleven Community Development Corporations (CDCs), which are companies that have developed from self-help neighborhood organizations. In 1982, however, these funds were drastically curtailed since the legislature appropriated only \$1 million to be divided among thirty-eight CDCs across the state (Stein 1982).

As federal and state funds have lagged, city and county governments have tried to pick up some of the slack. Since 1980, Dade County has spent \$6.7 million in building five parks in Liberty City. The City of Miami has spent \$1.2 million on two new parks. The Greater Miami Chamber of Commerce and Dade's Private Industry Council have raised \$5.4 million from local private companies to be invested in seed capital to help finance black businesses and to fund job training programs.

Two significant efforts toward achieving racial harmony have been made by the Dade County Public School System and the local police department. In 1978, 28 percent of the county's school employees were black, but blacks held only 13.7 percent of the administrative jobs. By 1982 blacks held 31 percent of the school system's jobs and accounted for 28 percent of its administrative positions (Silva 1982). This is especially significant when it is recalled that blacks represent only about 19 percent of the county's population. The Metro-Dade Police Department, which was despised by many Liberty City residents in the wake of the violent police-resident confrontations that sparked the 1980 riot, has been somewhat successful in mending relations with the Liberty City community. In 1980, only 15 percent of Metro's foot patrol in Liberty City was black. By 1983 this figure was 42 percent. Over this same period, the percentage of blacks among the department's officers increased from 8 to 12 percent. Likewise, the proportion of blacks in the City of Miami's police department has grown from 13 to 17 percent. In both the county and city departments, a greater emphasis has been placed on sensitivity training and mechanisms for third-party review of citizen complaints against county and city police (Zaldivar and Sachs 1982).

In 1980 (before the influx of Mariel Cubans), blacks accounted for 17 percent of Dade County's population, but black businesses received only approximately one percent of the county's purchasing and contracting business. As a result, in 1980 the Board of County Commissioners established a policy goal of reserving 17 percent of county contract money for black-owned businesses. Also, in awarding bids, the county now favors contractors who have established their own programs of "affirmative action" for hiring, training, and promoting blacks. The City of Miami also now has a program whereby 10 percent of its contracts are to be awarded to blacks (Tasker 1982).

The Overtown Setback

Despite these efforts, on December 18, 1981 Miami experienced another major setback in its race relations. A white police officer shot to death a young black man in a video arcade in the black district of Overtown (Fig. 1). Sporadic violence lasted for three days leaving two dead and at least twenty-five injured. Ten businesses were looted, vandalized, or destroyed and forty-three persons were arrested. The cost of the damages approximated one million

dollars. Although the Overtown disturbance was not as severe or extensive as the 1980 riot, this latest outbreak of violence illustrates the continued fragile nature of peace in many of Dade County's poor black neighborhoods.

It is somewhat ironic that Overtown was the site for racial disturbances because until the late 1950s it was one of the most vibrant of Miami's black communities. Its hotels were frequented by famous black entertainers who were barred from staying on Miami Beach where they often performed. Jazz bands and singers such as Sammy Davis, Jr., Nat King Cole, and James Brown played at the small night clubs along North West Second Avenue (known locally as Little Broadway). With integration in the 1960s, black performers and tourists began to stay on Miami Beach and many blacks migrated to such black residential areas as Liberty City and Richmond Heights. Finally, Overtown was gutted by two new expressways, I-95 and I-395. Between 1970 and 1980 its population declined from 10,603 to 4,583. It became an area of flop houses and vacant buildings and by 1980 was one of the poorest areas in Dade County, with an average household income only about one-fourth that of the rest of the county (Tomb 1982).

In 1980 a plan was unveiled by the City of Miami Planning Department for the redevelopment of Overtown and an adjacent area known as Park West. It is to be implemented over a 10 year period and is to cost \$78 million. Approximately 5,000 new housing units, both apartments and condominiums, are planned, along with about one million square feet of new commercial space. In addition, space has been reserved for a historic zone that should recapture some of the flavor of the 1950s. One major thrust of the plan is to attract many of the middle class black families who left Overtown during the 1960s and 1970s (Wright-McQueen 1982).

The Future of Dade's Black Districts

It is evident from this discussion that significant efforts are being made by many local private and public agencies to promote the development of the poor black areas of the county. The Liberty City area offers many advantages for industrial growth such as proximity to both a major airport and seaport, tax incentives, and an existing infrastructure of water, sewers, streets, parks, cultural and government centers, a heavy-industrial belt, relatively low rent, and a good transportation system. Despite all these touted attractions, few businessmen have settled in this area recently. Undoubtedly, the most difficult factor that has to be overcome is its image as a site of the 1980 riot and the 1981 Overtown disturbance. In addition, efforts to recruit new business to the area are bucking a national antiurban movement that is taking companies into suburban and rural areas, away from the central cities. The future of Dade's black districts, therefore, is by no means clear.

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1. Within Liberty City, the sample also included about fifty personal interviews with households without telephones. Such households were located by asking telephone respondents for the address of a neighbor without a telephone. This procedure was felt to be unnecessary in the other areas of the county where telephone ownership is much larger.
2. Most of the questions selected were based upon a desire to obtain specific information regarding certain characteristics, although some were selected to provide for comparisons with *The Miami Herald's* 1968 and 1980 attitude surveys. In addition, two surveys conducted in Chicago were used as sug-

gestions for possible questions (Surgeon, Mayo, and Bogue 1976; Davis 1977).

3. A similar attitude change was found by the Community and Family Study Center of the University of Chicago in two surveys performed in the Chicago metropolitan area in 1968 and 1975. In the 1968 survey, conducted shortly after a series of racial disorders, 33 percent of blacks and 4 percent of whites indicated approval of violent confrontation to promote the development of black areas. In the 1975 survey the figures declined to 3 and 1 percent, respectively (Surgeon, Mayo, and Bogue 1976).
4. In this paper a chi square figure that produces an alpha value equal to or less than 0.1 is considered as being statistically significant.

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