The Illusory Nature of the So-Called Objective World

Authors

  • Aleksandar Vuc Nikolic
  • Simon Glynn

Keywords:

human perception, mind, reality, real world

Abstract

This paper investigates the human perception of the world around us and the way we perceive
and experience it. Driven by curiosity about the “real world,” and if it truly exists, our senses
as a way of interpreting the real world are explored. I also analyze theories about this topic presented
by Rene Descartes and British empiricists: John Locke, David Hume and Bishop Berkeley, while
ultimately disproving certain aspects of them. In this quest of exploring reality, ideas like the mind,
primary and secondary qualities and subjective sense experiences are addressed. I ultimately argue
that there is no way of knowing if the real world exists, because we can only know what we experience.
Furthermore, if the real world did exist, it would by definition not be as it appears to us, because our
senses can only interpret the real world-not perceive it as it truly is.

Downloads

Published

2016-04-29

Issue

Vol. 5 (2016): FAU Undergraduate Research Journal

Section

Articles

License

  • Authors retain copyright and grant the journal right of first publication with the work simultaneously licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution License that allows others to share the work with an acknowledgement of the work's authorship and initial publication in this journal.
  • Authors are able to enter into separate, additional contractual arrangements for the non-exclusive distribution of the journal's published version of the work (e.g., post it to an institutional repository or publish it in a book), with an acknowledgement of its initial publication in this journal.
  • Authors are permitted and encouraged to post their work online (e.g., in institutional repositories or on their website) prior to and during the submission process, as it can lead to productive exchanges, as well as earlier and greater citation of published work (See The Effect of Open Access).