Forced Labor

Legislation, U.S Corporations, and Global Accountability

Abstract

This paper examines how U.S. legislation seeks to combat forced labor embedded in global supply chains and evaluates the practical limits of corporate accountability. Through the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 and its subsequent reauthorizations, Congress has sought to address exploitation associated with heightened reliance on low-cost production in weak regulatory frame- works. The 2008 expansion of 18 U.S.C. § 1595 broadened civil liability beyond direct traffickers to “whoever knowingly benefits,” adopting a constructive-notice standard to lower victims’ evidentiary burdens. To assess the law’s efficacy, the paper analyzes two illustrative case studies. In Coubaly v. Cargill, involving the major chocolate company Hershey, plaintiffs’ claims failed to find a traceable link between damages and the defendant-linked suppliers. In Doe v. Apple, plaintiffs cleared stand- ing for damages but lost on merits because routine buyer–seller relationships did not constitute “participation in a venture.” Collectively, these cases reveal a double bind: without specific traceability back to individual suppliers and the presence of venture-level ties, § 1595 claims falter. This analysis highlights a persistent gap between broad legislative policies and what courts require to impose civil liability, underscoring the challenges of enforcing corporate accountability in global supply chains.