BOOK REVIEWS

The Challenge of Southern African Regional Security: A Review of Peace and Security in Southern Africa. Ibbo Mandaza, editor. Harare: SAPES, 1996. 183pp.

Sub-Saharan African politics is framed by the triple challenges of democracy, development, and defense. In a context of postcolonial conflict, underdevelopment, failed states, and regional insecurity, Africans are attempting to erect viable, stable, enduring, and legitimate governmental structures that can ensure their citizens a reasonable quality of life. As a first course, this requires a focus on the political, economic, and cultural dimensions of Africa's security concerns in a systematic fashion paying attention to the peculiarities and continuities wrought from the dynamic security environment in the region. Ibbo Mandaza's (editor) *Peace and Security in Southern Africa* is a collection of five essays by Africa specialists that addresses the challenges of internal and external security for Southern African states. This effort derives from a larger research program of the South African Regional Institute for Policy Studies (SARIPS). The authors attempt to provide an expansive definition of peace and security, a discussion of the challenges to state building and democratization, an explication of the enduring impact of colonialism and dependence on regional security relationships, and an analysis of the prospects for regional cooperation and economic integration.

Mandaza's introduction lays out the scope of the project and is followed by Thomas Ohlson's lead essay on conflict resolution in Africa, which treads--often deftly--over familiar territory for those acquainted with arguments favoring the expansion of the security concept for analyses of post cold war states--especially those of the former "Third World" (e.g. Ayoob 1995, Buzan 1991, Job 1992, Klare & Thomas 1994). Ohlson recognizes -- as do the other authors in the volume -- that development, democracy, and security are linked, and he insists that there are no quick fixes for the region's security problems. He is emphatic that conflict resolution strategies should emerge "from the people" and that these should reflect the local circumstances that obtain in the region (p. 32). For Ohlson, democratization, the emergence of a regional security complex, and a conducive international environment are necessary precursors to regional stability.

The central argument for Ohlson is that Africa cannot copy the European experience as a pathway to development, democracy, and regional security. Hardly a novel suggestion (Henderson 1995), it has recently been echoed by African leaders such as Museveni who maintains that "We are building Afrocentric, not Eurocentric countries" (McGeary 1997, 40). Ohlson maintains that regional insecurity is likely to emerge from the diffusion of internal conflicts, tensions borne of interdependency, and asymmetries in economic and military power (p. 24). Assigning a dominant role to South Africa in regional development, he argues that the prospects for such developments are proscribed by the need for socioeconomic reconstruction

(p.27), a restructuring of South Africa's security apparatus (p. 27), and the adoption of compromise strategies among the major actors in South African politics.

While cogent and straightforward, this essay--like most of the essays in this volume--covers little new ground. A glaring omission in Ohlson's work that is symptomatic of most of the essays in this volume is the absence of both a theoretical framework for the emergence of cooperation among Southern African states in the region and a programmatic rationale for the development of interstate cooperation. What Ohlson and others put forward amounts to a functionalist inspired "wish-list" of African needs that are to be met as a result of some unspecified process that emerges "from the people."

These shortcomings are also evident in Tiyanjana Maluwa's article entitled "The Refugee Problem in the Quest for *Peace and Security* in Southern Africa." After acknowledging the impact of the proliferation of refugees on the security of Southern African states, Maluwa calls for a regional "Marshall Plan" to alleviate the refugee problem in the region (p. 139). It is not clear whether Maluwa favors a donor-driven strategy (p. 141)--which is highly unlikely anyway--or a regional effort focusing on the OAU and the SADC (pp. 143-4) or both. Nonetheless, beyond its desirability, it is not clear how this Marshall Plan is to be developed and instituted. Moreover, in "Emancipating Security and Development for Equity and Social Justice," Winnie Wanzala's argument that "[c]onfidence-building measures should ultimately aim to delegitimize the use of force" is laudable, but the mechanisms for such developments are unspecified. Beyond promulgating neologisms such as "multilogues" between various "NGOs, children's groups, student and youth groups, unions and women's groups" (p. 98), Wanzala offers a litany of ostensible policy prescriptions that are as ambiguous as they are untenable. For example, among the guidelines for developing a comprehensive security strategy there is the following item:

"The imperative to address forms of violence engendered by prevailing development and security approaches and alternatives, by identifying and encouraging awareness about the sources of direct, structural and cultural violence, and by encouraging questioning of socially designated boundaries and the dualisms they inhabit [original emphasis]" (p. 98).

These vague meanderings can hardly serve as effective templates for security policy.

Among the authors in the volume, Wanzala comes closest to offering policy prescriptions for Southern African regional stability that extend beyond primarily normatively driven "wish-lists" (e.g. p. 43). It is not that normative arguments are unimportant; clearly, any student of this region is immediately confronted with the atrocious human rights abuses that have plagued the citizens of the former Frontline States. Nonetheless, in the postcolonial era, citizens of Southern Africa require a program of action that attends to the priorities and tradeoffs that are necessary in any plan for development, democracy, and defense. There are unavoidable asymmetries that will accompany the reconstruction and reorientation of states such as are occurring in the region. The promulgation of utopic wish lists simply will make a difficult situation even more difficult as expectations rise and frustration mounts in the face of real scarcities in the internal and external environment of these states. In such contexts, even physical security is threatened.

It follows that security analysts should pose paradigms that reflect the strengths and limitations of Africa's newly democratizing institutions of governance without marginalizing the aspirations of the peoples in the region but at the same time taking into account the very

real scarcities that are unavoidable in nation-state building. While the authors are obviously concerned with the issues of Southern African security, they collectively fail to engage the core issues that would allow for theoretical consistency in their arguments and provide them with a point of departure for meaningful policy prescriptions. For example, Ohlson, asserts that, inter alia, asymmetries in economic and military power militate against Southern African regional development (p. 25-6). In Masa Sejanomane's analysis of the Lesotho Crisis of 1994, he, like Ohlson, decries the asymmetries of power and wealth in the region. Similarly, Sejanomane is critical of the intervention of the leaders of Botswana, South Africa, and Zimbabwe in Lesotho's succession crisis and suggests that even though their efforts appeared to decrease tensions in the tiny state, there is little to be garnered from the Lesotho case to inform analyses of African security (pp. 82-3). He is correct that Africans have yet to institutionalize a formal, effective (and widely legitimized) process of conflict resolution in the region but his dismissal of the "personalistic" attempts of the regional leaders to (even temporarily) resolve the conflict does not even allow for the impact of "demonstration effects" of such intervention on other potential "hot spots." This myopia is even more pronounced when we realize that it was the initiative of this troika of leaders that led to the establishment of the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) Organ on Politics, Defense and Security launched in Gaborone in July of 1996 which is the linchpin of an incipient and indigenous Southern African regional security apparatus.

Fundamentally, the authors in this volume fail to appreciate that the asymmetries in the region are not simply to be decried in light of normative arguments but have to be utilized to provide a degree of stability in the region. Campbell's contribution suffers from these limitations as well (p. 153). Although, he correctly challenges the problems of the privatization of violence in the hands of former security elements associated with the notorious South African Defense Forces (SADF), especially the mercenaries of Executive Outcomes (p. 154), his wholesale condemnation of the defense industry of South Africa dislodges his analysis from the realities of regional development. To be sure, Southern Africa has the potential to develop as a zone of peace, stability, and development; however, such is not likely to occur unless there is a degree of executive and personal security borne of institutional legitimacy, economic stability, and intercultural cooperation. The fear of coups in newly democratizing countries and retrenchment from deposed autocrats should be checked by regional collective security arrangements. The development of such collective security institutions will ensue, largely, as a function of the efforts of the regional military and economic power. This role obviously devolves to South Africa. Once apartheid-era white supremacists are expunged from the military leadership, a democratic South Africa will have to assume the mantle of "regional stabilizer." Clearly, regional security efforts are more likely to be successful when they are dominated by a preponderant power that can establish multilateral security regimes that provide collective goods, reduce transaction costs among members, engender trust among states, and check rogue state leaders. This argument is consistent with hegemonic stability models (Keohane 1984, Gilpin 1987) that posit that the presence of asymmetries in the distribution of material and economic capabilities among states in a region is often more conducive to regional stability (e.g. Weede 1976) wrought from the preponderant power's (or hegemon's) establishment and maintenance of international regimes to coordinate interstate

activity in some issue area(s). With the preponderance of South Africa clearly established, it would appear that Southern Africa is a candidate case for the emergence of hegemonic stability. Although it is not clear whether the SADC is presently equipped to serve as the vehicle for Southern African collective security coordination (see Hussein & Cilliers 1997), it appears to be progressing toward that end (Cawthra 1997).

Not only does hegemonic stability reduce elite insecurity but it can also lead to the amelioration of health and welfare concerns in the region. For example, in a hegemonic stability system, the provision of a security umbrella obviates the pursuit of arms spending among states and thereby reduces the likelihood of arms races and the conflicts they might spawn. Further, the presence of an international security regime might prevent states from wasting newly acquired capital on military expenditures. Botswana's recent purchases of Leopard tanks are instructive in this regard. Beyond the security concerns that such purchases cause in the region--especially in Namibia which is involved in a border dispute with Botswana over an island on the Chobe river--these expenditures would be more efficiently targeted to human capital formation, housing, and health care. In this way, a regional hegemonic stability arrangement might also lead to the creation of some of the more normatively inspired aspirations espoused by the authors in *Peace and Security*. However, Campbell's condemnation of the historic role of South Africa's security apparatus (which I largely concur with) seems to blind him to the potential developmental role of a transformed South African military establishment in a post-apartheid South African democracy. Moreover, South Africa's defense assets presently serve as an important source of income for the state and the region though under a security regime the resources of the South African arms sector can support African multilateral forces in peacekeeping roles. Such arrangements might afford poorer democratizing states the opportunity to begin to stand down their engorged military establishments and devote greater effort (and resources) to socioeconomic development.

One comes to appreciate these possibilities once one moves beyond the critique of the historic atrocities of the apartheid SADF and begins to address the opportunities provided by the transformations underway in South Africa. This is not meant to minimize the apartheid government's brutality but only to recognize the mechanisms in place that should be utilized to promote growth, democracy, and security in the region. These are sometimes brutal realities that scholars, policymakers, and practitioners must confront without glossing over the difficulties associated with development, democracy, and defense. Such points seem to be lost on the contributors to *Peace and Security*.

The failure of the scholars in this volume to engage the theoretical work--and much of the empirical evidence--on the development of regional security regimes leads them to parrot one another in decrying the asymmetries in Southern Africa instead of recognizing the possibilities that arise from these arrangements, specifically, the conflict dampening impact of such arrangements in light of hegemonic stability arguments. In fact, in a departure from the other essays, Maluwa argues for the imposition "upon the body politic of the region such structures as are necessary to ensure the existence of viable autonomous, self-sustaining political and economic entities which can satisfy the varied needs of the citizenry and eradicate the factors which compel nationals to flee their countries of origin"(p. 143). This "top down" approach is akin to hegemonic stability perspectives, but the author does not appear to recognize the

theoretical implications of his own arguments. The reader is left with a conceptual hodgepodge of amorphous strategies and ambiguous and untenable policy prescriptions when Southern African security challenges require much more.

All told, *Peace and Security* attends to some pressing issues in the region but does little to point the way forward toward regional stability. To be sure, the authors' suggestions that solutions should emerge "from the people" and that these solutions should be aimed at resolving issues of security, broadly defined, has some currency. Nonetheless, bereft of a theoretical rationale to explicate the situation as it stands, their proscriptions are largely gratuitous. We are left with the need to construct a security framework for Southern Africa that attends to the changed post cold war international environment and the opportunities provided by the asymmetries in the region (which clearly are not going to "go away" in the near future). I contend that the asymmetries that the authors decry should become the building blocks for regional stability. In its zeal to suggest how Southern Africa "ought to be", *Peace and Security* fails to adequately attend to Southern Africa "as it is".

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Mokoko, the Makgoba Affair: A Reflection on Transformation. Malegapuru William Makgoba. Johannesburg: Vivlia Publishers, 1997. XXIV+243pp.

Arguably the premier academic institution in South Africa, the University of the Witwatersrand--popularly known as Wits--in Johannesburg, a bastion of white, Anglo-Saxon liberalism, prides itself in having practised "academic non-segregation" (i.e. admitting black students on merit) before the government's 1960 *Extension of University Education Act* forced it to comply with apartheid. Indeed, many African intellectual luminaries such as Chabani Manganyi, Vincent Maphai, Ezekiel Mphahlele, Njabulo Ndebele, Sipho Seepe, Robert Sobukwe and Herbert Vilakazi each studied or taught there at one time or another. Yet, between October 1995 and March 1996, what became known as "The Makgoba Affair" pitted the then newly-appointed Deputy Vice-Chancellor (Academic Affairs) and world-renown medical scientist, M. William Makgoba (an African), against thirteen of his liberal colleagues (all but one of whom were white) led by historian Charles van Onselen in a vicious and deadly power struggle for control of the agenda for change at the University and, ultimately, for the hearts and minds of its students and staff. It is the fascinating story of this epic battle between thirteen "conservative Eurocentric" scholars and a lone "Africanist Afrocentric" scholar (p. xxi)--in effect, a modern "remake" of the Battle of Makgobaskloof between his illustrious ancestor Chief Makgoba and the cattle-farming Boers of June 1895--that is chronicled in painstaking detail by and from the perspective of Makgoba the latter in *Mokoko, The Makgoba Affair*.

There are in fact two scripts, or sub-texts, to the book's main story. One is an intellectual autobiography of Malegapuru William Makgoba, admittedly a perilous exercise for someone who is only a few months shy of his 45th birthday. The other is a highly personal account of the recent process of transformation occurring at Wits written by one of its main actors-turned-victim. While the latter is to some extent informed by the former, the two sub-texts can be read separately as two distinct scripts. This *confusion des genres* is one of the book's main flaws and accounts for this reader's uneasiness in attempting to disentangle objective reality from opinion, and fact from fiction.

By any standards, Makgoba's academic credentials are impeccable, and his scholarly achievements most impressive. A graduate of the University of Natal's Medical School (then reserved for Blacks), Makgoba went on to study biochemistry and to research for a D.Phil. in human immunogenetics at Oxford University on a prestigious Nuffield Dominion Fellowship. After a stint as lecturer in Medicine at the University of Birmingham (1983-1985), he was selected to the National Institutes of Health's visiting scientist program in Bethesda, Maryland

(1986-1988). From there, he moved to the Royal Postgraduate Medical School in London as senior lecturer in molecular endocrinology. Finally, in October 1994, Wits, who had "head-hunted" him for some years, made him an offer that he could not refuse: Deputy Vice-Chancellor (Academic) and Professor *Ornamentarius* (meaning "ornamental"?). William Makgoba spends an inordinate amount of time (and book space) expounding on his outstanding academic achievements, and has a full chapter (Chapter 11, pp. 142-170) which is nothing but an exhaustive resume detailing the numerous research grants and fellowships, honours and distinctions gleaned during his short, but eventful carrier. He even finds it necessary to throw in dubious distinctions, such as those conferred (usually for a price) by the International Biographical Centre or the American Biographical Institute.

Makgoba is justifiably proud of his considerable achievements as an African scientist, but the overkill leads him to sound intellectually pompous and arrogant and utterly self-centered, if not downright egocentric, as the following statement clearly indicates: "I am today a sophisticated man (...) who has earned accolades from some of the world's best and leading institutions, mainly because of my unquestioned brilliance as a scholar and pioneering achievements as a medical scientist, with few equals in my field and even fewer superiors" (p. 46). After all, he is not the first or the most prominent African geneticist (professor Pascal Lissouba preceded him in this field, but went astray as president of the Congo), nor the only world-renown African scientist (the achievements of Cheikh Diarra, a Malian-born American scientist at NASA who supervised the Mars Exploration Program and conceived and directed the recent Pathfinder Mission, comes to mind). What sets Makgoba apart from his fellow African scientists is the South African environment from which he originates and in which he must now operate, an environment pregnant with the legacy of apartheid in which considerations of race and color still prevail over intellectual prowess and academic achievement. It is because his thirteen colleagues had questioned his credentials, that he is forced to overstate his accomplishments in order to set the record straight, once and for all. That he has done so successfully is beyond question.

What is questionable is his resort to some unorthodox--and, possibly, unethical--methods of struggle, such as his surreptitious access to his adversaries' personal files and resumes (as he himself admits on pp. 123-126), or his consultation of traditional healers for "protective medicines" designed to scare his enemies (recounted in minute detail on pp. 137-139), a most intriguing practice coming from a world-renown medical scientist. There is also a distinct paradox and inherent contradiction in the fact that on the one hand Makgoba craves for international recognition as "a first rate, world-acclaimed African scientist" (p. xix) trained in "some of the world's best and leading institutions" (p. 46), while on the other hand he advocates a distinctly Afro-centric vision of South African education which, in his view, "must take into account the primacy of Africa and what it embodies in its history, philosophy, identity and culture" (p. 206).

The second sub-text of Makgoba's story relates to the debate around the process of transformation occurring in South Africa's institutions of higher learning in the new political dispensation of the post-apartheid era. Organised within "Transformation Forums" representing all the stakeholders--students, lecturers, top administrators, as well as general administrative and technical support staff--this process is supposed to progressively change the structure,

composition and orientation of all tertiary institutions so that they adequately reflect the interests, priorities and needs of the African majority in the country. Starting from a Pan-Africanist position grounded in the Black Consciousness Movement, Makgoba claims, with justification, that the liberal lobby within Wits--epitomized by the "Gang of thirteen"--was hell-bent on slowing down and derailing this transformation process in order to maintain their power and privileged status within the system. Indeed, Makgoba clearly implies (as on pp. 172-173) that it is because he was perceived as a potential contender for the top job of Vice-Chancellor (soon to become vacant) that he had to be destroyed by the still-powerful conservative lobby within Wits. While the ultimate settlement of the dispute through legal mediation resulted in Makgoba staying on at Wits as *ad hominem* professor of molecular immunology, it effectively put him out of the race for the top job.

While the author's argument is morally, legally and politically sound, the rather inelegant and shoddy manner in which it is put forward is highly questionable. Throwing together a series of articles on the subject of transformation in South African higher education written between 1995 and 1997 (Chapter 12) with minimal editorial work leads to tedious repetitions and results in a severe lack of focus and clarity which considerably weakens the overall argument. Likewise, the author's crude and uninspired broadsides against Marxist ideology confirm the overall impression that if he is indeed a reputable medical scientist, he is a rather mediocre social scientist. For whatever else may be said of Marx, he most certainly was not "(...) a distorter, misrepresenter of information and facts"(p. 101), "reputed to have cooked (sic) his facts to construct his theories" (p. 55). And no political historian in his right mind would dare venture the view that "The great Marxist disciples, Mao Tse-Tung and Stalin, have both provided the world with unquestionable evidence of the limitations and fallacies of Marxist theory." (p. 55). We are left to surmise what that "unquestionable evidence" might be...

Based on solid moral and legal grounds, Makgoba's rather vague and ill-defined Afro-centric approach also happens to be politically correct in the sense that it adequately and genuinely reflects the views of the formerly excluded and marginalised but newly-empowered majority African population in post-apartheid South Africa. Who, for instance would take issue with his view that

"The African university must not pursue knowledge for its own sake, but for the sake of, and the amelioration of, the conditions of life and work of the ordinary man and woman. It must be fully committed to active participation in the social transformation, economic modernisation, and the training and upgrading of the total human resources of the nation" (p. 176)?

Herein lies the book's greatest strength and its intrinsic value as a significant piece of evidence to be added to the already voluminous dossier currently being compiled by various educationists on the subject of transformation in higher education in South Africa.

As a sad footnote to this story, one should mention the fact that after a grueling selection process, Wits appointed a renown U.S.-based South African political scientist, Sam Nolutshungu as Vice-Chancellor-designate on October 27, 1996. In January 1997, already suffering from the dreadful multiple myeloma that would take his life on August 14th, 1997 Nolutshungu politely declined the offer. Barely a week after Noluthungu's death, Wits officially announced that Colin Bundy, Deputy Vice-Chancellor at the University of the Western Cape

and radical scholar of some repute, had been selected as the University's next Vice-Chancellor. Is this a case of history repeating itself? As the French saying goes *plus ca change, plus c'est la meme chose*!

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Religious Pluralism and the Nigerian State. Simeon O. Ilesanmi. Athens, OH: Monographs in International Studies (Africa Series, No. 66), 1997. 299pp.

The overlay of global missionary religions such as Christianity and Islam on the traditional religious map of Africa has evolved in the face of two major contradictions. One is geo-political. Here global and traditional religions, which had a regional presence, now find themselves contained by the boundaries of modern nation-states. The second is legal. Religions, global and indigenous, with their own institutional and legal histories, must now negotiate their presence and activity within the framework of national law, which with its pre-colonial conceptions, is grounded in a secular vision that sees religions as occupying a distinct sphere, separate yet regulated by the state.

Nigeria, as Simeon Ilesanmi points out in this study of the role of religious pluralism and modern politics, offers a multi-layered context for analyzing these contradictions and their historical consequences for the relationship between religion and state in Africa's most populous country.

In choosing to address the issue, he takes the view that religious perspectives and concerns cannot be divorced from public life, that to dichotomize religion and politics would be to create an untenable polarity. His own approach and conclusions are intended to lead to an applied ethic, which aims at reconciliation of diverse points by creating a public philosophical discourse as part of Nigeria's effort to create unity. This discourse, combining theological insights against an interdisciplinary perspective, offers a kind of world-view that links political and religious life for the goal of "civil amity."

The first two chapters set out the theoretical perspectives and review existing scholarly and theological perspectives on religious pluralism, politics and the state. The author's main reference points, as laid out in the beginning of Chapter Two (p. 55) are the works of well-known scholars and theologians such as Murray, Penny, Lovin and Reinhold Niebuhr. All their work, however, is primarily in a Christian and Western context. Their general theoretical and practical insights are probably very useful, but some larger context, including more detailed references and background on theological and political issues in Latin America, the Muslim world, and Africa might have been much more useful as a framework for looking at Nigeria's particular situation. The "dialogic" process emphasized by the author needs to be a global one and not driven exclusively by theoretical assumptions located within one cultural matrix of scholarship and theological concerns.

In a section dealing with the so-called Sharia debate, Dr. Ilesanmi clarifies the contradictory attitudes that the debate has generated by masking deeper questions related to the role of religion in public life. It is useful to remind ourselves that the discussion among Muslims in Nigeria is influenced to a great extent by two factors: the internal diversity of Muslim opinion and the impact of similar debates going on in other parts of the Muslim world. The assimilation of the whole of Islam into the limited context of the Sharia debate suggests that among Nigerians, Muslims and others, a greater awareness of the broader context of Muslim life, public and private, needs to be developed. This complements prescriptive religious life and enlarges the world of Nigerian Muslims, whose own specific make-up can then be viewed in the wider context of a pluralistic religious landscape in the region as a whole, not to mention Nigeria itself. The same situation applies to Christianity as indeed to the indigenous religions and their overlap with Islam and Christianity in the lives of many Nigerians.

Pluralism still remains the great hope of most emerging African nation-states after the demise of Communism. This study provides a good starting point toward identifying the connection between religion and pluralism as a key factor in the reconstruction of public life and common political discourse in Nigeria.

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Discourses on Democracy: Africa in Comparative Perspective. Julius E. Nyang'oro, editor. Dar es Saalam: Dar es Saalam University Press, 1996. XV+311pp. : Ill.

Julius E. Nyang'oro's edited volume, Discourses on Democracy: Africa in Comparative Perspective, makes debates about African democracy available to African students and scholars. In his introduction, the editor correctly points out that discussions about democracy in Africa take place largely in the universities and academic journals of Europe and North America, fora outside of Africa that rarely invite participation by the mass of Africans that are the subject of these discussions. Published by Dar es Salaam University Press, thus presumably widely available in the English-speaking university community in Africa, this volume helps fill the gap between African and Western scholarship and is likely to have a seminal effect on discussions of democracy, especially among young African scholars. A compilation of classic works about African democracy from the late 1980s and early 1990s, the volume serves as an introduction to the subject of African democratization valuable both to the "African University Students," to whom the volume is dedicated, as well as to First World scholars who will appreciate the breadth of the discussions included in this single volume.

There is no doubt that Discourses on Democracy is valuable as an introductory text, but that said, it is also important to point out that, in bringing together a wide range of opinion and observation, Nyang'oro neither synthesizes or prioritizes the arguments he presents, nor does he make any contribution to the "cutting edge" of scholarship. Scholars who are abreast of the

most recent research on African politics will find nothing new here, although the volume's juxtaposition of theories and arguments may serve to reinvigorate old debates.

The most important contribution made by Discourses on Democracy is that it assembles in a single volume the whole range of the debate about democracy in Africa, from the liberal mainstream, to critiques of the currently dominant liberal paradigm. Authors such as Samir Amin, S. N. Sangmpam, Yusuf Bangura, and Ken Post point out the difficulties of instituting democracy at the same time as capitalist economic development is creating conditions of extreme inequality on both domestic and international economic fronts. These authors give pride of place to economic relationships in their analyses as they advance the notion of "popular" democracy in Africa. Other scholars, such as Richard Sandbrook, Michael Bratton, Naomi Chazan. and Daryl Glaser, by and large accept the vicissitudes of capitalism in Africa's democratic equation, while they concentrate their analyses on issues of individual rights, legal frameworks, and political process associated with "liberal" definitions of democracy. In his introduction, Nyang'oro draws on the work of Issa Shivji to describe these two poles of scholarship and effectively uses the tension between "popular" and "liberal" authors to enhance the debate.

The inclusion of the "African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation," as well as the work of Ken Post, who, in Nyang'oro's own words is "one of the few remaining diehards who see no prospects for democratic development on the continent under the guidance of capitalism," suggest that Nyang'oro is more intent on establishing the limits of debate in terms of "popular" democracy than he is on communicating the dominant liberal position. Indeed, if the volume lacks any important point of view, it is probably that of a die-hard liberal-capitalist. Daryl Glaser's emphasis on the importance of individual rights for democracy is as far as Nyang'oro permits the debate to go in the liberal direction. However, considering the reality of political and economic conditionalities enforced by international finance in Africa, it is likely that Nyang'oro's principal audience (the African intellectual) is already all too familiar with unrepentant liberal-capitalist ideology.

Nyang'oro also includes several articles that lie outside the popular vs. liberal theoretical framework. Richard Sklar's contribution, the oldest piece in the volume, provides a historical backdrop to discussions of African democracy in the 1990s and serves to remind readers that it was not long ago that scholars were calling for researchers to take up the topic of democracy in Africa. In 1987, when Sklar's piece was first published, his was a lonely voice, but only a few years later, his perspective appeared prescient, a testimony to the enduring appeal of democracy in Africa and the multiple research agendas available to students of democracy.

George Sorensen's contribution concerning the role of the state in economic development is certainly liberal in terms of theoretical assumptions, but his use of examples from the Far East serves to critique the application of liberal economic theory in Africa. Another article which does not fit neatly into the popular vs. liberal framework is the piece by anthropologist Maxwell Owusu. Perhaps reflecting his disciplinary roots, Owusu focuses his analysis at the grassroots of politics suggesting African democratization should be linked to the practices of direct democracy that are commonly found in village level governance throughout Africa.

Because it touches upon so many aspects of the democratic debate, Discourses in Democracy is a welcome addition to the African democratization literature. Let us hope that

this important summary of a critical topic will be made widely available to its intended audience.

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Federal-State Relations in Nigeria's Second Republic. Joseph Okoroji. London: V.O.R. Publications, 1997. 72pp.

A common theme expressed in publications that examine the political fortunes of post-independence Sub-Saharan Africa is frustration -- frustration that an area with such great potential continually deflates the best-laid plans of visionaries and practically-minded administrators, planners, and constitutional experts alike. Perhaps nowhere is this sentiment more often expressed than in commentaries on Nigeria, a country blessed with a large, relatively well-educated population, such abundant natural resources, and so many natural advantages that it would seem to place in the upper tier of world nations. Instead, Nigeria seems to always fall below the expectations of the world community. In the past thirty years, three separate constitutions have been crafted and launched amidst much fanfare and international acclaim. Each time, however, political forces have appeared to be out of control and civil disorder threatened, providing ready-made excuses for the military to intervene.

Joseph Okoroji's relatively slim volume (just 72 pages) contributes to the already vast literature on Nigeria with a rather narrowly pitched study of the trials and tribulations of federalism during the Second Republic (1979-1983). While he never makes a clear statement about his purpose, Okoroji seems to have two reasons for undertaking this study. Like a number of others who have examined this subject, Okoroji seeks to determine why this second constitutional framework failed to provide the glue required to hold Nigeria's notoriously divided population of over 200 ethnic groups together. To this end, the author describes several informative episodes that illustrate the non-cooperation which bedeviled the Second Republic almost from the very beginning. These include the federal-state confrontation over the construction of the Nnewi-Afikpo road, the struggle for control over the single national police force, suspicions surrounding the appointment of Presidential Liaison Officers, and arguments over reaching an equitable revenue allocation formula for the distribution of federal funds to the nineteen states. All of these add substance to several previous articles on Nigerian federalism that typically are long on rhetoric but short on detail.

Another purpose to this book is the author's intent to demonstrate that, in certain respects, the Second Republic constitution actually did provide some minor successes in mitigating conflict between rival ethnic groups and political units in the federation. It is in this latter endeavor that we see some real contributions; so few have acknowledged these strengths since the Second Republic fell with such a resounding crash in the last months of 1983. This point is illustrated with a look at the federal-level Council of State, the workings of state liaison offices

in state capitals, external borrowing, inter-state relations, and the way in which the "federal character" principle was implemented in Anambra state. Unfortunately, these examples are not described with enough detail to make them anything more than brief overviews. The author would have done us a greater service by focusing on one or two of these cases and devoting more analysis to them.

While I certainly wish to acknowledge the insights the author provides through the case studies, I would be very hesitant to recommend this slim volume to any save those who are already well initiated in the inner workings of Nigerian politics. The author does not seek to provide any detailed background in which to center his detailed study. As a result, the reader is confronted with a whole series of political personalities, parties, associations, and institutions that would only be familiar to the most seasoned observers. A chapter on the colonial experience with federalism and another on the First Republic would have been helpful in this regard, especially since the political, social, and economic dynamics of the Second Republic were certainly set in place long before 1979. Indeed, the politicians and leading political movements that shaped the Second Republic were almost identical to those of the First Republic.

Readers who are already familiar with the study of Nigerian politics will find the author's treatment of constitutional theory, institution-building, and the wider literature on Nigerian federalism to be frustratingly inadequate. Apart from B.O. Nwabueze's 1983 work on the Second Republic constitution, and two or three woefully out-dated pieces from the early 1960s, the author cites no other works on the subject. As such, he ignores a rather voluminous literature that has arisen based on the efforts of both Nigerian and foreign academics to cover the span of three separate constitutional eras. Another problem is that the author limits his theoretical treatment of federalism only to aspects of structural design. This leaves the theoretical underpinnings of the book open to much criticism. For example, there is no consideration given to the large literature on state-society relations and political culture that could give additional insight as to why the level of constitutional choice has been so ineffective in resolving deep societal divisions in Nigeria. Also ignored is the even more extensive literature on Nigerian political economy and incipient class formation.

In the final chapter, the author muses about a particular model of federalism that might be preferable for Nigeria, especially given its past history. A brief analysis is offered of the applicability of the federal constitutions of Germany and Canada, but ironically, no mention at all is made of the Third Republic constitution that was brought into existence by the Babangida military government in 1989. This is an egregious oversight for a book published as late as 1997! The Third Republic constitution offered some new modifications to the Second Republic model, especially in the realm of federalism, and the author should have devoted some attention to it.

All in all, I find little useful in this book to recommend beyond the details provided in the brief case studies.

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