

# Coal Sector Revitalization, Community Memory, and the Land Question in Nigeria: A Paradox of Economic Diversification?

IKECHUKWU UMEJESI

**Abstract:** In 1999, the Nigerian government unveiled new policies aimed at revitalizing the mining, agricultural, tourism, financial services, and manufacturing sectors in a broader effort to diversify the national economy. While this was a response to the reality of underdevelopment in the country, it was also a response to research that has attributed the country's developmental and governance failures to decades of over-dependence on its vast petroleum resources. The new plan has attracted unprecedented attention from foreign and local mining firms to previously under-exploited minerals such as coal, gold, tin, bitumen, talc, limestone, uranium, asbestos, limestone, and iron ore (known collectively in Nigerian government and business circles as "solid minerals").

Using the coal industry as a case study, this article looks beyond the "economic diversification" objectives of resource sector reforms and interrogates coal sector revitalization against narratives of entitlement, land dispossession, and repossession in the mining communities. The central question is: how does privatisation impact on the revitalization process, and what role does community memory and material interests in land, play in the emerging conflict between the mining communities and the Nigerian state? The analysis is based on ethnographic data obtained in the South-eastern Nigerian town of Enugu-Ngwo, the country's premier coal mining community. The article also draws lessons from the Nigerian petroleum sector.

## Economic Reforms and Grassroots Concerns

The return to democratic governance in Nigeria in 1999 after almost two decades of military rule coincided with a surge in grassroots militancy in the oil producing Niger Delta region, where local communities are engaged in violent contestations with the state and transnational oil companies over unsustainable socio-ecologic practices and what they see as "inadequate compensation" for land expropriated for oil exploitation.<sup>1</sup> The implication of this conflict on crude oil production—Nigeria's economic mainstay—has been a gross shortage in industry

**Dr. Ikechukwu Umejesi** is a Research Fellow in the Department of Sociology, University of Fort Hare, East London Campus, South Africa. He is a 2009 YSP Fellow of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), Laxenburg Austria.

<http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v12/v12i3a1.pdf>

output, leading to Nigeria's loss to Angola in 2008 of its place as the highest producer of crude oil in Africa.<sup>2</sup>

The deficiency in production and low earning from crude oil implied that the government's major source of revenue has come under serious threat.<sup>3</sup> As a way of stemming the negative impacts of overdependence on single export product—crude oil—the Government of Nigeria in 1999 initiated its economic reform agenda through the passage of Public Enterprises (Privatisation and Commercialisation) Act, No. 28, in which the revitalisation and privatisation of the moribund solid minerals sector was targeted as one of the possible complements to the threatened oil sector.<sup>4</sup>

The stated goals of the Nigerian government in the reform program comprises: creation of new enterprises, market expansion, increased tax revenue, higher income, increased employment, efficient management of the enterprises, general entrepreneurial innovations, investment inflows, and poverty reduction.<sup>5</sup> The privatisation exercise was expected to be successful in the hope that the growing global demand for primary products, especially from Asia, would attract foreign investors and help accomplish government's economic reform objectives. The growth of the Asian market since the 1990s has led to an increased flow of foreign capital into Africa for the sourcing and control of primary products. The intense search for primary products in Africa by global markets has led to what scholars have *rightly* or *wrongly* likened to a "scramble for Africa."<sup>6</sup> In other words, an attempt by global economic powers to carve out spheres of economic hegemony in different parts of Africa reminiscent of the nineteenth and twentieth century pre-colonial and cold war era competition among European nations for the control of Africa.<sup>7</sup> While the earlier scrambles highlighted the political economy interplay among contending foreign powers, the primary aim of the post-independence scramble, is the control of Africa's only comparative advantage, its natural resource endowments. Some of the resources targeted in the continent include: crude oil, coal, tin, and uranium among others.

Although the nature of this "scramble" or heightened interests in Africa's natural resources is outside the purview of this article, it is re-enacting certain characteristics of earlier European political and economic relations with Africa. Issues such as an official disregard of grassroots concerns for their land ownership rights, exclusion of local people in the discussion of concessions, and issues regarding the fate of land acquired under colonial institutional provisions have also characterised the current economic reform agenda of the Government of Nigeria as well as other states in Africa. For advocates of privatisation, "Privatised enterprises are desirable because they yield revenues and the proceeds from the sale become available to finance new governmental programs."<sup>8</sup> While privatisation as an instrument of achieving corporate efficiency and realising the state's economic objectives has of late been de-emphasised even by its most ardent advocates, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), it has continued to be used as an instrument of economic reform in most developing countries. For instance, in 2003, the *Wall Street Journal* published the headline, "The World Bank as Privatisation Agnostic," in which it stated that World Bank officials "Have now decided it does not matter whether infrastructure is in public or private hands."<sup>9</sup> Bayliss and Kessler's study on privatization and commercialization as a tool in the achievement of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) has identified different factors other than privatisation

that motivate efficient public sector management and profitability. These include citizenship equality in the workplace and an ability to deal with institutional problems and official corruption.<sup>10</sup>

In developing countries, the sense of urgency among state officials to privatise moribund or less profitable public enterprises and attract foreign capital inflow has often exposed their economies to the abuses of international capital.<sup>11</sup> This dilemma has in the new rush for Africa's natural resources, raised questions about the stake of local communities and their socio-ecologic concerns.<sup>12</sup> Fraser and Lungu noted in the case of the privatisation of Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM) that the desperation to remove the burden of ZCCM through concessioning to foreign firms, coupled with weak state institutions, gave international mining corporations undue advantages in their negotiations with the state that compromised national security, community health, and socio-ecologic wellbeing. According to them, "Some investors have taken advantage of the fact that Zambian state institutions are too weak to effectively regulate their behaviour. The state itself also seems to have developed political relationships with certain mining houses that mean health and safety, labour, immigration and environmental regulations can be ignored with impunity, causing significant [grassroots] resentment."<sup>13</sup>

Also writing on the privatisation of copper mines in Zambia and the effects of its compromised contractual "Developmental Agreements" (DAs), Rohit Negi notes: "Among other things, neoliberal cosmologies prescribe that the state enact and enforce mechanisms to make its territory attractive to capital."<sup>14</sup> Since these frameworks were primarily made to "attract" foreign investments, grassroots concerns are often bypassed. It is against this background that the privatisation process in Nigeria, as it relates to coal mines and a community's collective memory over its land acquired for colliery development in 1915 is interrogated. The article, therefore, poses the question of how has the privatisation exercise impacted or likely to impact on local discourses in communities where state-owned enterprises are located?

Discourses on natural resources in Nigeria often focus on community-based revolts in the Niger Delta against what local people see as state and corporate insensitivity to their ecology. Little or nothing is heard of evolving discourses of discontent in solid minerals producing communities such as Enugu-Ngwo, the country's premier coal producing community in Nigeria's South-east. The community's discontent is rooted in colonial era land acquisition for the establishment of the colliery. The community's aversion to the privatisation of its coal mines and agitation for the return of their land is based on its reliving colonial era land acquisition agreements, which stated that the mines were acquired for a "public purpose." In other words, the community questions the imperative of *selling* "their" mines to corporate firms when the land (on which the mines are located) was supposedly acquired for a public purpose in the first place.

The article examines the relationship between the state and local communities regarding land ownership rights from the colonial era. This relationship, as the article will show, has impacted postcolonial land-related conflicts. The analysis here illustrates how a state's macro-economic agenda could impact on community's collective memory, and how the community's

reaction to what they see as official neglect could forestall the economic objectives of the state. The analysis is based on archival and ethnographic data obtained between November 2007 and March 2008 from Enugu-Ngwo.<sup>15</sup>

### **Contesting for Land: the State and Communities**

Since the evolution of the modern nation-state in Africa, the identity of indigenous communities became subsumed in the state, although the local communities did not willingly give up their sovereignty during the formation of the supra state that has come to dominate them. The birthing of the “powerful” state over previously independent indigenous communities perhaps demonstrated parallels in the development and decline in influence between “the state” and “local communities” respectively. In other words, the growth of the state led to the decline of the influence the formerly independent communities wielded over their common property resources, especially their land. To explain this phenomenon, the Libertarian, Albert Jay Nock equated the rise of “State power” to the decline of individual and societal rights. He noted: “Every assumption of State power, whether by gift or seizure, leaves society with so much less power; there is never, nor can there be, any strengthening of State power without a corresponding...equivalent depletion of social power.<sup>16</sup> Also, Bertrand de Jouvenel stated that history “is the picture of a concentration of forces growing to...the state, which disposes, as it goes, of ever ampler resources, claims over the community ever wider rights, and tolerates less and less any authority existing outside itself.”<sup>17</sup>

The skewed relationship that exists between independent African states and local communities in relation to control and allocation of resources, in which the state is mirrored as a “leviathan” by the communities, gave rise to an attitude of hatred for the nation-state among local people. Whereas the state demands citizenship responsibilities from the local peoples, it is seen to give back little or nothing to the communities in terms of physical developments.<sup>18</sup> As a result of this, Davidson and Munslow stated: “They [local people] begin to see the nation-state as a curse.”<sup>19</sup> The perception generated by this relationship produces centrifugal feelings, and conflicts on the part of the local communities, whereby local people begin to question the relevance of the state to their communities.

The colonial economy depended primarily on commodities such as agricultural products and mineral resources. In order to grow its economy, the colonial government acquired indigenous land, hence resulting to conflicts with local people over ownership rights.<sup>20</sup> David Lea has noted the clash of what he termed “acquired rights” of the state/corporate bodies and “aboriginal rights” of local people.<sup>21</sup> In other words, the grassroots often opposes a situation whereby the state superimposes new a tenure system over indigenous tenure. This form of institutional framework developed during the colonial era in Nigeria when the colonial state took possession of land under the Crown Land regime.<sup>22</sup> Crown tenure implied that the state now owned any acquired land for public good on behalf of the people of Nigeria.<sup>23</sup>

The crown tenure system replicated what was applicable in England and in British imperial territories, not minding the effects of such imported tenure on the local people. Writing on the introduction of crown tenure in parts British empire, C.K. Meek noted: “The king [of England] had complete freedom of disposal of the crown lands, which were constantly being increased by

confiscation, escheat or forfeiture.”<sup>24</sup> This manner of acquisition and control of land by a centralised authority was a novelty for indigenous communities in Southern Nigeria where land is more or less owned collectively. In Northern Nigeria, it was relatively adapted to the centuries old feudal institution established by the Muslim emirs.<sup>25</sup> L.S. Amery, a former dominion secretary in Britain, differed with the imperial idea of making the colonies look like England. To him, western values “tend to judge distant problems in the light of its own experience and to try to fit them into its own formulas, regardless of their relevance to local conditions.”<sup>26</sup>

The development and the growth of the solid minerals sector during the colonial era witnessed the elaborate application of this new tenure in certain communities where mineral resources were discovered.<sup>27</sup> The local communities whose lands were acquired for public good seemed not to have understood the full implication of the acquisitions; they thought that the colonial state held their land in trust for their community.<sup>28</sup> In other words, local people did not understand that the colonial state had acquired such lands permanently. Hence, while the state treated crown lands as belonging to the state, the local people regarded these lands as part of their community, but held in trust for them.<sup>29</sup>

With the prospects of independence, the thinking among local communities in the emerging states was that their postcolonial governments would address the “injustices” of the colonial state, including land thought to have been wrongfully taken, unemployment, socio-economic inequalities, and lack of basic infrastructure in rural areas.<sup>30</sup> In Kenya and Zimbabwe for instance, where grassroots disenchantment with discriminatory land policies that favored European settlers had been entrenched for several decades, the expectation of sweeping reforms that would see local people repossessing their land from the state and settlers was high.<sup>31</sup> In his reminiscences and regrets of the decolonisation process, Chinua Achebe recounted the hopes ordinary people had for redressing perceived colonial injustices and “how passionate we felt and how good it was to be in the movement that would liberate us after centuries of denigration and deprivation.”<sup>32</sup>

Incidentally, the postcolonial state was much more concerned with strengthening its authority over component parts than with returning indigenous land or relinquishing sovereignty to former independent kingdoms. Jefferey Herbst saw the failure of postcolonial African states to change the basic institutions of the colonial state that affected ordinary citizens as an endorsement of the colonial regime in post-independent Africa. He reasoned that, while the new states and their leaders still recognised and romanticised with the glorious names of past empires (e.g., Ghana, Mali, and Benin) they rejected any suggestion of restoring the old institutions.<sup>33</sup> In Kenya, Ngugi wa Thiong’o’s *Homecoming* captured the dashed hopes of Kenyans for postcolonial land redistribution this way: “What does independence mean? Independence has not given them back their land.”<sup>34</sup> Kaniye Ebeku observed the same grassroots disappointment in Nigeria with the failure of the postcolonial government to reform the institutional and legal frameworks they had inherited: “It is therefore paradoxical that the same persons who had so resented colonial statutes on mineral oils moved to retain the essence of these laws after independence.”<sup>35</sup>



Postcolonial Nigeria strengthened its hold on land with more stringent and far reaching laws. The passage of the Republican Constitution of 1963, the Petroleum Act of 1969, and the Land Use Decree of 1978 meant a steady decrease of the indigenous hold on land and the right of obtaining compensation when land was acquired. The official reason given for these laws, especially the Land Use Decree of 1978, touched on strengthening statutory accessibility to land whenever the need for land acquisition arose.<sup>36</sup> The implication of Land Use Decree of 1978 to the indigenous owner varied. It means first, the loss of his so-called “native rights” recognised in Southern Nigeria since the Native Land Act of 1916; second, the loss of the right to negotiate compensation for surface rights; third and perhaps the most intriguing of all, the loss of ownership status, whereby the indigenous owner becomes an “occupier.”<sup>37</sup> In other words, since ownership has been expropriated by the state, the indigenous “owners” become merely an occupier and also lose their right to negotiate compensation.<sup>38</sup> The effect of this provision on the communities is that the state in the exercise of its “powers of overriding interest” (or eminent domain) could allocate indigenous land to a corporate mining company without consulting the community that owns the land. Interestingly, other laws in Nigeria since the promulgation of the Land Use Decree in 1978 (such as the Nigerian Minerals And Mining Act, 2007 which is the substantive law in Nigeria that regulates activities in the solid minerals sector), have followed this pattern in which statutory authority over land and natural resources is given primacy over the rights of the local people.

It is perhaps this same thinking that the state is applying in relation to the privatisation of its moribund enterprises located in local communities. Although the state might justify its actions based on statutory provisions that allows it to exercise powers of overriding interest on such establishments, in the case of Enugu-Ngwo, the exercise has thrown up grassroots discourses around colonial era agreements that seem to question the legitimacy of privatisation of coal mines.

## Research Methods

### *The Study Community*

This study was conducted in Enugu-Ngwo community, Enugu State, in South-eastern Nigeria. Although in 1928 the colonial government separated Enugu, the town, from Ngwo, the village, this study uses the indigenous compound name “Enugu-Ngwo” to refer to the land and people whose ancestral land were ceded in the agreements of 1915 and 1917 for the development of the colliery and the town.<sup>39</sup> It was discovered during the field research in 2007/2008 that local people, as well as recent court cases refer to the town and the village as Enugu-Ngwo.

Prior to British colonialism, much of the local populace lived at the foot of the Milliken Hills where the city (or town) of Enugu later developed.<sup>40</sup> However, colonialism and the discovery of coal in Enugu-Ngwo altered the settlement pattern and location of the people.<sup>41</sup> With the state acquisition of 16,700 acres of farmland in 1915 and the subsequent demographic shift that ensued, some of their villages, including Ajaagu-Agangwu, Uwani farmlands, and parts of other Enugu-Ngwo settlements, were acquired for mining, the rail station, and urbanisation.<sup>42</sup> The implication of this demographic dislocation resulted in the development of cluster villages on the hilltops overlooking Enugu city and the valleys.

### *Study Techniques*

Ethnography and in-depth interviews constituted the main methods of primary data collection. During field research (from November 2007 to March 2008), field observations, in-depth interviewing, and focus group discussions were conducted with a wide array of respondents. They included chiefs, political leaders, youth and student leaders, ordinary citizens, women leaders, and former miners. A focus group discussion was held with six retired coal miners aged above 60 years. The respondents were purposively selected, based on their knowledge of state-community relations regarding the colliery. Some of the issues addressed by the respondents include land acquisitions made by the colonial government, privatisation of the colliery, and the availability of land for indigenous uses.

The National Archives and National Museum provided documented historical accounts of the evolution of the colliery, land acquisition agreements between the indigenous rulers and the colonial authority, and local reactions to these acquisitions. These documents and photographic displays of the colliery from its earliest times provided good accounts of colliery history and some insights that the Enugu-Ngwo community and the Nigerian Coal Corporation did not provide.

### *Background to the Coal Industry in Nigeria*

Coal is said to have been discovered unexpectedly in Enugu-Ngwo in 1909 by Albert Ernst Kitson, a colonial British mining engineer attached to the Mineral Survey of Southern Nigeria.<sup>43</sup> He was seated on the head carriage of carriers when suddenly he spotted a sub-bituminous coal outcrop.<sup>44</sup> After this initial discovery, there arose the need to acquire land for the exploitation of this new find.

Prior to commencing of mining, the colonial government in 1915 acquired from the indigenous owners 16,700 acres containing the coal deposit by means of an "Agreement."<sup>45</sup> The Agreement reads in part:

We, the undersigned chiefs of Udi division of the Southern Provinces of Nigeria, fully appreciating the benefits which will be derived by us and by our people by the opening of a government colliery at Enugu-Ngwo in the said Udi division do hereby grant without charge, free and voluntarily unto the government of Nigeria all such lands as may be required by the said government for the purposes of a [rail] station and colliery, for the working of all coal and other minerals, all and any other purposes for which the said government may think fit to use the said lands; *the said lands so required having been clearly marked by beacons on the ground and pointed out to us as delineated and shown on the plan...* And we do hereby acknowledge the receipt of the sums set forth in the schedule attached to this agreement in full payment of all compensation due to us, our towns and our people, and to all persons residing on or having an interest in the said lands for damage done to all houses, crops and trees and other property on the said lands" (emphasis added).

These acquisitions (or crown land) were made in perpetuity—a framework that does not seem to be fully understood by the local people (see the emphasis above). In other words, the community lost ownership of the land to the state, permanently.<sup>46</sup> The “permanency” of the crown acquisitions, perhaps, differentiates it from the acquisitions in the oil-rich Niger Delta, where land owners are allowed limited rights to “negotiate” their compensation. Land owners are also paid periodic rents every ten years by the international oil companies.<sup>47</sup>

It might be pertinent to know if local signatories understood the implications of the cession to their community. To show that the indigenes of Enugu-Ngwo community may not have understood the content of the agreement of cession with the colonial officials, local people continued to “intrude” into the “ceded land” for farming and other activities.<sup>48</sup> A petition written by the Enugu-Ngwo community in 1938 to the “Colonial Enquiry” into a land dispute between the Nike and Enugu-Ngwo communities also suggests that the community may not have been properly informed of the implications of the cession. The petition reads in part: “Do you believe that a man can sell his land and sell up to his dwelling place (reference to their land acquired in the Crown cession), we beg most respectfully to say that we and our Chiefs (those who thumb-printed the said agreements) did not know anything about it.”<sup>49</sup>

In relation to the 1915 and 1917 agreements between the Enugu-Ngwo chiefs and the colonial officials, Onoh observed as follows:

[T]he so-called chiefs were not as the British then thought, autocratic rulers who could dispense communal land as they wished; they were not empowered to grant any land; the villagers had no idea that their land was being disposed of and it is very likely that many of the chiefs were no nearer grasping the real situation as they have not seen a coalfield before, and would not have appreciated the “benefits” accruable from coal production.<sup>50</sup>

By this acquisition, the area fell under crown land administration. In other words, the acquired land had become state-owned land, a development local people had never experienced. It contravened indigenous tenure by concentrating decisions on alienation and administration in the colonial system and denied the people participation in land management. This aberration was a failure on the part of colonial officers who did not understand indigenous land use practices in the region.

Indigenous societies in Eastern Nigeria were not hierarchical. Decisions, especially on matters related to land, originated with the people through their representatives. Since there was no strongly institutionalised authority in these communities, decisions on common property resources revolved around the people.<sup>51</sup> The new tenure system alienated the local communities and benefited the colonial state. Commenting on how the British colonial system of land administration alienated indigenous Australians, Val Plumwood noted that the system was one in which the “interests of the dominant party were disguised as universal and mutual, but in which the colonizer actually prospered at the expense of the colonized.”<sup>52</sup> Independent Nigeria did not dispense with the crown land system. It christened such land “government land” and increased its reach with more stringent land use laws such as the Land Use Decree of 1978, even though local people continue to see the land as their own. Local discourses on the persistent intersection of ownership claims between the state and local people in Enugu-Ngwo since the privatisation exercise is detailed below in the “Findings” section.




### *The Corporatisation of the Colliery: Collapse and Privatisation*

The Nigerian Coal Corporation (NCC) was established in 1950 by the Coal Ordinance Act No. 20, which gave it a full monopoly for coal exploration and exploitation in Nigeria.<sup>53</sup> The Corporation's monopoly lasted from inception until 1999 when the Nigerian government deregulated coal mining and opened up the industry to private participation. With dwindling output and rising costs of production, NCC divested completely from the sector in 2001 when production dropped to a low of 2, 712 tons.<sup>54</sup>

Prior to its divestment, NCC was the sole supplier of energy fuel to the then Electric Corporation of Nigeria (ECN), as most of Nigeria's power stations were then coal-fired. The corporation also supplied the fuel needs of the Nigerian Railway Corporation (NRC) and much of the pre and immediate post- independence heavy industries in Nigeria. It also exported coal to other West African countries. Production peaked, from 583,487 tons to 905,397 tons between 1950 and 1959.<sup>55</sup> However, mainly due to official neglect this growth rate could not be sustained in the 1960s and 1970s post-independence era. Many reasons have been given for the remote and immediate causes of the collapse of the Nigerian coal industry. These include dieselisation of the country's railway system, the impact of the Nigerian civil war, the introduction of gas-powered electric turbines by the defunct National Electric Power Authority (NEPA), the closure of certain industries that patronised the NCC (such as cement factories and steel plants), official neglect of the coal sector as a result of oil price boom in the 1970s, and an alleged installation of "inappropriate" mining equipment in the mines by Polish partners among others.<sup>56</sup>

**Figure 1: Coal Production in Nigeria, from 1916 – 2001**



(Source: MSMD: Information Memorandum on Onyeama Coal Concessions)

1999 saw the launch of privatisation and commercialisation of different government corporations declared moribund or non-profitable by the civilian government. This initiated the process of concessioning the Onyeama and Okpara mines in Enugu-Ngwo (the two most productive mines in Nigeria), which were closed in 2001 when production slumped to bottom

levels (see Figure 1). In May 2007, the coal mines in Enugu-Ngwo were concessioned to Global Infrastructure Incorporated of India, although the community had in 2004 obtained a substantive court injunction restraining the privatisation of the mines. The community had argued that based on the Agreement of 1915 the mines were established primarily for public purpose and not for private ownership.<sup>57</sup> In other words, the community views privatisation of the mines as a breach of the Agreement of Cession. The local people also contended that private ownership of the mines presented some socio-ecologic uncertainties for their community. To the majority of the respondents in our survey, privatisation implies dispossession of their common property resource (i.e., land) without a renegotiation of the terms of acquisition.<sup>58</sup> The next section presents local narratives of land deprivation and also the role of communal memory in the evolving discourses.

## Field Findings

### *Beyond the Benefits of Privatisation: Land as a "Social Agent"*

Beyond the economic benefits expected to accrue to the Enugu-Ngwo community from privatising the mines, one interesting area of the privatisation discourse is the perception that years of coal production constitute defilement of the land. A local chief saw it as "stripping mother earth naked" and noted that land in Eastern Nigeria is not just a "factor of production" to its owners but is also regarded as a source of life, hence the popular adage that "land is life."<sup>59</sup> The connectedness between the living and the dead that the land signifies is often expressed in proverbs and idioms. In an interview, the chief quoted above somewhat regretted the years of mining in his community. Although he acknowledged what he said was "the good side of NCC" (he meant infrastructural development and scholarships awarded to his people), he noted that: "To us in Ngwo, land is life. In Igbo tradition, land is our mother that gives us life. However, our mother [the earth] is now naked and she is dying of thirst. Her throat is parched from a century of coal mining. Her fertility prowess has gone away from her and she cannot yield again."<sup>60</sup>

A similar sense of cultural reminiscence was shared by a retired school teacher, now a shop owner.<sup>61</sup> To him:

Although I am a communicant in the Catholic Church here in Ngwo, I have not lost knowledge of what our land means to our spirituality. I believe that our land needs rest from much troubles [he meant coal mining]. For example, we swear by the land to show it is a god with the power of life and death. So it needs respect. If they sell the mines and the land surrounding them to any buyer, be assured that we may not survive the wrath that will come out of that.

The implication of such views is that while it is obvious that certain benefits of privatisation, such as employment opportunities and the growth of small scale businesses that may accrue to the community, these benefits do not convince all sections of the community. An evolving discourse on earth spirituality and its essence to the survival of the community is the concern of these cultural protagonists in the population. While they oppose privatisation, they do so based

on the need to respect the sanctity of the land, not necessarily on the need to redistribute the land as the mainstream opponents of the privatisation exercise suggest.

### *Coal Sector Privatisation and Community Memory*

The struggle for land repossession is seen as a response to the government's privatisation program, which those opposed to it believe breaches the 1915 and 1917 state-community agreements. Their major contention is that communal land was acquired for public good. The privatisation program thus evoked collective memory of what is to them the spirit of the agreements of 1915 and 1917—that their land was not sold, but held by the state in trust for public good. Privatisation of the mines without renegotiation of terms of acquisition, hence, became for the community, a breach of agreements between their forefathers and the colonial state. For the local people, land related negotiations must be based on the recognition that their land must be held as a trust by the state or returned to the pre 1915 status. As a youth leader complained:

Land has left us since the so-called 1915 agreement with colonial officials. The city developers have bought the few lands that were left by the colonial officers and we are just boxed tight between the high hills and steep valleys of Ngwo. We are living on the edge as far as land is concerned. Now the opportunity provided for us by the divestment of the Federal Government [of Nigeria] to regain our land is being denied us by the Indians (the concessionaire is an Indian company).<sup>62</sup>

Although the community obtained a court injunction from the Federal High Court in Enugu in 2004 restraining the Federal Government of Nigeria from carrying out the privatisation, the state did not appeal this judgment. In May 2007, an Indian company, Global Infrastructures, Inc, emerged as the winner of the concession. The state's action or what a school headmistress and women leader saw as the "state's lawlessness" generated a sense of frustration in the community. According to her:

You are free to read the agreements of 1915 and 1917. These agreements said the land is ours and that it was not sold. Our fathers gave the British the land to mine coal. When NCC failed and the mines closed, I had expected the government to hand over our property to us. I think it is not just privatisation alone; I see state lawlessness in it, especially after Enugu High Court in 2004 defended us and restored our land to us... How can I support the sale of mines, where do you expect us to farm? Alienation is a soft word. We are raped by the system we found ourselves in. Anytime I drive across those contentious areas, I feel like a raped woman, my pride is taken away. My grandfather told me that his mother planted pepper and okra on some parts of this land. Some of the areas have been fallow over the decades, some are built up; but the corporation is dead and gone because of corruption. We want to live like humans. If we have the land we can share it among the various families.<sup>63</sup>

There is a note of injustice in the narratives of the indigenes who questioned the legality of the privatisation exercise in which they claim the community was not consulted before the government privatised the mines. Hence, to the respondents, the government's top-down approach to privatisation and disregard for the judicial process is an insult. These respondents, who believed that the state's policies regarding the colliery lacked grassroots support, pointed to the violent contestation in the Niger Delta as a likely scenario to emerge in their community once the concessionaire assumes control of the mines. This view, expressed by a traditional title holder in the community, touches on the opinions expressed by other respondents who oppose the sale of the mines:

We do not have enough land in this community to farm or build our houses. We live on the mountaintops since our lands were taken over by the colonial masters when coal was discovered in this community. I believe it was on the premise that the mines will be a commonwealth of the country that our fathers surrendered the land free of charge. These people [Enugu-Ngwo chiefs] were not paid for their land; they were only given £273 for their trees and crops on the land. Privatising the mines when they did not buy its land is very unfair and we reject it. Why did they do this? We are against the procedure the federal government [of Nigeria] adopted. We were never consulted; they did not refer to the process and content of the acquisition agreements. This community can mobilise enough resources to buy back the land, I mean all the investments made on the land. We are capable.<sup>64</sup>

### *A Community Polarised*

Apart from the allegation of unfair official treatment levelled by a section of the community, one significant dimension of the controversy dividing the community is the disagreement between different groups on what should be done with the mines and the land. While the popular voice expresses an anti-privatisation sentiment, a minority (mostly ex-miners) supports privatisation. The pro-privatisation group is referred to as "For India," which is a derogatory reference to their supporting a foreign interest in the mines against what the dominant group see as "communal interest."<sup>65</sup> The opponents of privatisation identify themselves as "For community." They sound a patriotic note with this tag. Although the "anti-privatisation" group seemed to have more grassroots support because of its land reacquisition and distribution agenda, some respondents, especially among the ex-miners did not see anything wrong with privatising the mines if that will ensure the mines are revitalised. A student leader from the Hilltop village accused this group of working against the community's goal of retaking its indigenous land from the government, because, they believe that government-mediated privatisation would safeguard the future of their pensions:

You see, I do not know why a few people should be working against the desire of the entire Enugu-Ngwo. I understand their frustration, they want their pensions, good; but what of the future of their children? I think they should not support those who rob Peter to pay Paul. I mean the government who wants to please Indians at our expense.<sup>66</sup>

While he called their agitation the “desire of the entire Enugu-Ngwo,” the focus group discussion with former miners revealed that although the opposition to privatisation cuts across different segments of the community (the youth, women, local rulers), privatisation nevertheless has strong support among the former miners.<sup>67</sup> On the allegation of their indifference to what has been described as the “community’s position,” the ex-miners acknowledged their community’s need for land and the prevalence of anti-privatisation opinion. However, they accused their opponents of intolerance to other views relating to the future of the mines. To one of them, community opinion leaders use the debate on the mine privatisation to “incite the youth and whip up community sentiments against any differing group.” One discussant, who reflected the position of those who support the privatisation, put it this way:

I think these boys [the youth] and their leaders are misinformed. The problem started when the corporation [NCC] collapsed as a result of mismanagement and corruption. Is it not a wise decision to get the foreigners [Indians] or any private company to revive the mines? I was an underground miner for 26 years and anytime I pass through Onyeama mine area, I often cry. The mine is now flooded and overgrown with bushes. The workshops and the conveyor machines have been stolen by vandals. If the mines are given to us [the community], can we revive them? I assure you that those who want the mines only want to sell them to whoever they wanted. They are selfish. I worked there for 26 years and now I am not receiving any pension...If the mines are revived, they might restart the payment of pension.<sup>68</sup>

Although the groups differ on their approaches towards the privatisation exercise, one issue that unites them is the community’s dire need for land. None of the respondents disagreed with this issue. My research assistant, an indigene of the community, led me to the Hilltop terrace farm land overlooking the Coal Camp (a section of the city) where he showed me family farms. The land has been overused and gradually eroded by fast running water from the sloping hills. My assistant also noted how youth migration from the community has affected the socio-economic life of the Hilltop dwellers. According to him: “Over 60 percent of those who live on the hilltop settlement are the elderly because the youths have no future in the community as a result of shortage of land to farm or build homes. This has become a colony for the elderly; life is no longer vibrant here.”<sup>69</sup>

There is overwhelming although not universal support to retake the land. Against the backdrop of the community’s understanding of the 1915 and 1917 agreements, one wonders if recovering the land is an attainable goal, especially in light of the passage of certain land and mineral laws such as the Mineral Oils Ordinances of 1945 and 1953, the Petroleum Act of 1969, the Land Use Decree of 1978, and the Minerals and Mining Act of 2007.<sup>70</sup> These laws have one thing in common, the strengthening of state powers to expropriate communal and individual properties for the so-called public use and the corresponding decrease of communal and individual rights to their land.



## Conclusion

This article has sought to demonstrate firstly, that land related controversies between the state and local communities has been entrenched since the evolution of the Nigerian nation-state with the introduction of crown tenure; secondly, the privatisation of the coal mines shows a parallel understanding of land ownership rights between the state and the study community. In other words, the state and the community had different conceptions of public good. While the state did not limit “public good” to running the colliery as a state-owned enterprise, the overwhelming view in the community is that public good does not extend to privatising the coal mines. The community believes that the colliery must remain state-owned; for them anything to the contrary becomes a breach of the agreement of acquisition.

An examination of the framework in state-community land use relations in Nigeria reveals that the introduction of crown land tenure in the colonial era (1900-1960) alienated local people from their land by shifting indigenous land rights to the state. It was based on the crown framework that other laws were enacted in postcolonial Nigeria which consolidated the official hold on expropriated land. This continued hold on land by the state against the will of local people has led to agitations for the recovery of what local people see as a lost right. In exercising the powers of eminent domain, the state determines what it considers as public good even when such interests conflict with that of indigenous landowners. Since the state owns the subsurface mineral rights and could in addition dispossess the surface owners of their rights, it implies therefore that the state could transfer ownership of privatised mines to any foreign or local firm that emerges the winner of a bid process. It does not seem to matter to the state whether the community’s immediate environment will be under the threat from the mining company. Consideration is often given to the profitability of the investment rather than any other issues.<sup>71</sup> The exercise of eminent domain on community or private properties has been found to be prone to state abuse. The Cato Institute, a Washington DC based policy think-tank, described the abuse of eminent domain as taking “property from one owner, often small and powerless, and transferring it to another, often large and politically more connected, all in the name of public good.”<sup>72</sup> For Anthony Gregory, the state is likened to a “supreme lordship” in the way it abuses eminent domain.<sup>73</sup>

In the coal producing community of Enugu-Ngwo, privatisation of the coal mines has awakened collective memory of a near century-old colonial pact in which conditions for the acquisition of their land were stated. For local people, land-related negotiations must be based on the recognition that land either belonged to the community or was held in trust by the state for public good. It could not be ceded to private interests without the community’s consent. A common sentiment in Enugu-Ngwo is that the state either takes direct control of the mines for the public good or returns the land to the communities. Mines in private hands could never meet the definition of the common good. The 2007 privatisation of the coal mines was based on the understanding that the state owns all land in Nigeria and that coal development, whether undertaken directly by the state or by private companies, was for the common good.<sup>74</sup> This, to the communities is eminent domain abuse; robbing communities of “their” land and handing it over to private companies.

Although the coal mines in Enugu-Ngwo are statutorily owned by the state (based on legislative appropriations such as the Land Use Decree of 1978 and the Nigerian Mining And

Minerals Act of 2007), experience in state-community resource-related conflict in Nigeria has shown that the legality of ownership of resources is not usually enough to ensure a safe atmosphere for resource exploitation. This is demonstrated by the oil-rich Niger Delta where sustained grassroots agitation against the state and oil multinational companies has affected crude oil production. The success of the Niger Delta militants in affecting crude oil production has bolstered restiveness among other mineral-rich communities. Emphasis on communal goodwill (community licence) rather than much emphasis on economic considerations or legality of ownership might help the state achieve its economic reform agenda especially in the privatisation of coal mines and other resources in the solid minerals sector.

## Notes

- 1 Obi 2008a.
- 2 *Guardian* 2008.
- 3 Nigeria earns about 95 percent of its foreign exchange from crude oil production (Shell, 2006). Its oil industry production capacity of 3.2 million barrels per day was reduced to 1.8 million barrels per day in 2008 through the activities of Niger Delta militants.
- 4 The Solid Minerals Sector in Nigeria comprises all non-oil and gas mineral resources.
- 5 [www.bpeng.org](http://www.bpeng.org).
- 6 Ghazvinian 2007.
- 7 Obi 2008b.
- 8 *Ibid.*, p. 1.
- 9 See Hall and Lobina 2004, p. 2 (see also, IMF, 2004).
- 10 Bayliss and Kessler 2006.
- 11 Negi 2011, p. 10.
- 12 Fraser and Lungu 2007.
- 13 *Ibid.*, p. 3.
- 14 Negi, p. 36.
- 15 The fieldwork was done between November 2007 and March 2008.
- 16 Nock 1935.
- 17 Cited in Woltermann 1992, p. 1.
- 18 Zolberg 1968, p. 72-76.
- 19 Davidson and Munslow 1990.
- 20 The local communities practised an agrarian economy. They also had mystical understanding of land as the abode of ancestors and a trust for the unborn generation (Shipton 1994).
- 21 Lea 1993.
- 22 Although the Crown tenure was first introduced in Northern Nigeria in the first decade of 1900s, it was used expediently in the South to acquire land where the colonial state discovered mineral resource deposits.

- 23 Meek 1946.
- 24 Ibid p.87-88.
- 25 Mabogunje 1979, p. 21. Feudal system of land ownership had preceded colonial rule in parts of Northern Nigeria. It was part of the Islamic institution that was introduced in Northern Nigeria in the 14th century. This system lasted till the period of Crown acquisitions.
- 26 Amery 1953, p. 181.
- 27 NAE: OP/2917/1948.
- 28 Onoh 1997.
- 29 Ibid.
- 30 Zolberg 1968.
- 31 Betts 2006.
- 32 Achebe 2009, p. 1.
- 33 Herbst 1997.
- 34 Thiong'o 1972, p. 56.
- 35 Ebeku 2001, p. 3.
- 36 Adedipe et al 1997. The Land Use Decree of 1978 is often regarded as the most drastic land use law in Nigeria.
- 37 Ibid.; see also Land Use Decree 1978 in Allott 1978.
- 38 See Section 2(2C) of Land Use Decree 1978 in Allott 1978.
- 39 Ikejiofor 2004.
- 40 JCR 2001.
- 41 Onoh 1997.
- 42 Hair 1954.
- 43 NMM Presentation 2006.
- 44 Carriers were local men who knew the geography of their neighborhood well enough. They were used as "beast of burden" by the colonial authorities and missionaries to ferry their white officials to their destinations under very harsh service conditions comparable to slavery. They used wooden planks as carriages. NMM Presentation 2006.
- 45 Agreement of Cession 1915, p. 1. Another agreement was signed by chiefs in 1917 which recognized Nike community as part owner of a section of the land used for the development of the railway and the town (Hair, 1954). This part of the land has remained contentious between Enugu-Ngwo and Nike communities. The new agreement also contained the signature of Chief Onyeama, a prominent Enugu-Ngwo Warrant chief missing in the first agreement (Onoh 1997).
- 46 See Shell D'Arcy 1957; SPDC Rent Receipts 1997.
- 47 Ibid.
- 48 During the wars of conquest and pacification in the first quarter of 20th Century, colonial officials drafted the terms of these so-called "agreements" without inputs from the local people and their rulers. The indigenous rulers were usually coerced into accepting to abide

- by the terms of the agreement to avoid reprisals from the colonial authorities (see NAE OP1867 1938; Hair 1954; Isichei 1976).
- 49 Cited in Onoh 1990, p. 5.
- 50 Onoh 1997, p. 4.
- 51 Isichei 1976; see also Brown 1996.
- 52 Plumwood in Adams and Mulligan, eds. 2003, p. 51.
- 53 MSMD 2006.
- 54 SFCD 2008.
- 55 Ibid.
- 56 MSMD op cit. The civil war was fought between Nigeria and the breakaway Republic of Biafra from 1967-1970, the coal mines are located in the heartland of the war zone.
- 57 See Court file: FHC/EN/CS/216/2004.
- 58 Ibid.
- 59 John Okeke. 2008. Personal interview<sup>3w</sup>, Coal Camp Enugu City, Nigeria. 8 February 2008 (transcripts in author's possession).
- 60 Ibid.
- 61 Ekene Ugwu. 2008. Personal interview, Hilltop community, Enugu-Ngwo, Nigeria. 1 March 2008 (transcripts in author's possession).
- 62 Peter Nwodo. 2007. Personal interview, Ogbette Market in Central Enugu City, Nigeria. 11 December 2007 (transcripts in author's possession). He said he was arrested in 2004 for protesting the privatisation of the colliery.
- 63 Agnes Ugwu. 2008. Personal interview, Hilltop Village Enugu-Ngwo, Nigeria. 6 February 2008. (transcripts in author's possession). The court did not "restore" the land to the indigenes. It only restricted the government from privatizing the mines.
- 64 John Okeke. 2008. Personal interview, Coal Camp Enugu City, Nigeria. 8 February 2008 (transcripts in author's possession).
- 65 The company that bought the mines is an Indian owned company. This group consists of mostly ex-miners. They want the colliery privatized not because of what the community will benefit but for the chances of getting paid their pension arrears. A few of them expressed feelings of deep attachment to an industry they spent much of their youthful age working for. They refer the agitation against privatization as "youth affair," although the opposition to privatization cuts across all segments.
- 66 Interview with a student leader from Hilltop Enugu-Ngwo (aged 26 years). Hilltop village is one of the villages of Enugu-Ngwo community. As the name indicates, it is situated on top of the Milliken Hill. It is believed that the inhabitants of this community ran up hill as a result of displacement when the exploitation of coal began in 1915.
- 67 A Focus Group Discussion was held with six ex-miners in Enugu. All of the participants are from Enugu-Ngwo. Their age ranged from 63 to 75 years. The discussion was held at Ogbette Enugu on the 19th February 2008.

- 68 A retired miner, petty shop owner at Ngwo market. Interviewed at his shop on the 18th of February 2008.
- 69 My research assistant was an undergraduate of Electrical/Electronic Engineering at the Enugu State University. I engaged him because of his knowledge of what local people refer to as: "Coal politics." He has also lived all his life in Enugu-Ngwo (aged 28 years).
- 70 Although the mines and the issue of land seem to affect the entire community, yet I found some in the community who showed apathy to discuss the state-community face-off.
- 71 Fraser and Lungu 2006.
- 72 Cato Institute in Akpan 2005, p.135
- 73 Gregory 2006, p.1
- 74 See Nigerian Land Use Decree of 1978 in Allot (1978).

## References

- Achebe, Chinua. 2009. "My Regrets over Nigeria." *Daily Sun Newspaper Nigeria* 26 January. [www.sunnewsonline.com/webpages/features/newsonthehour/2009/jan/26/newsbreak-...](http://www.sunnewsonline.com/webpages/features/newsonthehour/2009/jan/26/newsbreak-...)
- Adedipe, Nurudeen Olorun, et al. 1997. "Rural Communal Tenure Regimes and Private Land ownership in Western Nigeria." *Land Reform Bulletin* 2: 1-13.
- Agu, Josiah O. 1990. *Ngwo: Its People and Culture*. Enugu: Ohio Publishers.
- Allott, Anthony Nicholas. 1978. "Nigeria: Land Use Decree, 1978." *Journal of African Law* 22.. 2: 136-60.
- Amery, LS. 1953. "The Crown and Africa." *African Affairs* 52. 208: 179-85.
- Bayliss Kate and Kessler Tim. 2006. "Can Privatization and Commercialization of Public Services help Achieve the MDGS? An Assessment." Poverty International Centre, UNDP. *Working Paper* 22:1-45.
- Betts, Raymond F. 2006. *Decolonisation: Making of the Contemporary World*. New York: Routledge.
- Brown, Carolyn. 1996. "Testing the Boundaries of Marginality: Twentieth-Century Slavery and Emancipation Struggles in Nkanu, Northern Igboland 1920-29." *Journal of African History* 37.1: 51-80.
- Cato Institute. 2002. "Eminent Domain: Its Uses and Abuses." Cited in Akpan, Wilson. 2005. "Putting Oil First? Some Ethnographic Aspects of Petroleum-related Land Use Controversies in Nigeria." *African Sociological Review* 9. 2: 134-52.
- Davidson, Basil, and Barry Munslow. 1990. "The Crisis of the Nation-State in Africa." *Review of African Political Economy* 17.49: 9-21.
- Dike, Kenneth Onwuka. *Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta 1830 – 1885*. London: Oxford University Press, 1956.



- Ebeku, Kaniye, SA. 2001. "Oil and the Niger Delta People: the Injustice of the Land Use Act." *CEPMLP Online Journal*. 9 June 2007. [www.dundee.ac.uk/cepmlp/journal/html/vol9article9-14.html](http://www.dundee.ac.uk/cepmlp/journal/html/vol9article9-14.html).
- Ezeigbo, HI and Ezeanyim, BN. 1993. "Environmental Pollution from Enugu Coal Mining Activities in the Enugu Area, Anambra State Nigeria." *Mine Water and the Environment* 12. 1:53-61.
- FHC/EN/CS/216/2004. Federal High Court Enugu Suit: In the matter of Privatisation and Commercialisation of the Nigerian Coal Corporation's Landed Properties, plots/structures by the Bureau for Public Enterprises.
- Fraser, Alistair and John Lungu. 2008. *For Whom the Windfalls? Winners and Losers in the Privatisation of Zambia's Copper Mines*. Lusaka: Civil Society Trade Network of Zambia. <http://www.liberationafrique.org/IMG/pdf/Minewatchzambia.pdf>.
- Ghazvinian. John. 2007. "Untapped: The Scramble for Africa's Oil." 26 July 2008. [www.slate.com/id/21633898/](http://www.slate.com/id/21633898/).
- Gregory, Anthony. 2006. "The Trouble with 'Just Compensation'." <http://www.mises.org/story/2379>
- Government of Nigeria. 2007. "Nigeria Minerals and Mining Act of 2007." Government Official Gazette.
- Guardian Newspaper. 2008. "Govt Frets over Drop in Oil Production." *The Guardian Online Newspapers*, Lagos Nigeria. 27 July 2008. <http://www.guardiannewsngr.com/business/article02//indexn4.html>
- Hall, David and Emanuele Lobina. 2008. "The Relative Efficiency of Public and Private Sector Water. Public Services International (PSI) 2005." 24 August. [www.world-psi.org](http://www.world-psi.org).
- Hair, Paul Edward Hedley. 1954. "A Study on Enugu." Unpublished Manuscript, National Archives Enugu.
- Herbst, Jefferey. 1997. "Responding to State Failure in Africa." *International Security*. 21. 3: 120-44.
- Ikejiofor, Uche. 2004. "Nigeria: Informal Land Delivery Processes and Access to Land for the Poor in Enugu, Nigeria." *Informal Land Delivery Processes in African Cities*. DFID Working Paper 2.
- International Monetary Fund, 2004. "Public-Private Partnerships." Washington DC.
- Isichei, Elizabeth. 1976. *The History of Igbo People*. London: Longman.
- Joint Community Resolution. 2001. "Ngwo Indigenous Community of Enugu North LGA."

- Lea, David. 1992. "Libertarian Theory, Customary Communal Ownership and Environmental Protection." *Reasons Papers* Fall: 39-59.
- Mabogunje, Akinlawon Ladipo. 1979. "Land and Peoples of West Africa." In J.F. Ade Ajayi and M. Crowder (eds.) *History of West Africa*. Vol. II. London: Longman.
- Meek, Charles Kingsley. 1946. "A Note on Crown Land in the Colonies." *Journal of Comparative Legislation and International Law* 3.28: 87-91.
- Ministry of Solid Minerals Development. 2006. Okpara Coal Concession: Information Memorandum. Abuja, Ministry of Solid Minerals Development.
- National Archives Enugu, file OP2250: Agreement of Cession (1915).
- National Archives Enugu file OP 1867/1938. "Crown Lands: Enugu Crown lands, waterworks Ngwo."
- National Archives Enugu OP. 1867/370. Cited in *Federal High Court, Enugu* suit no. FHC/EN/CS/216/2004.
- National Archives Enugu OP 2917/1948. "Acquisition of Land for Public Purposes Instructions."
- National Museum and Monuments. 2006. National Museum and Monument Presentation. Enugu.
- Negi, Rohit. 2011. "The Micropolitics of Mining and Development in Zambia: Insights from the Northwestern Province." *African Studies Quarterly* 12. 2: 27-44.
- Nock, Albert J. 1935. *Our Enemy, the State*. New York: William Morrow & Company.
- Obi, Cyril I. 2008a. "Oil as a cause of conflict in Africa: peering through the smoke and mirrors." Paper presented at the XIV South African Sociological Association (SASA) Congress on "Natural Resources and Local Livelihoods" (Stellenbosch, South Africa).
- \_\_\_\_\_. 2008b. "Enter the Dragon? Chinese Oil Companies & Resistance in the Niger Delta." *Review of African Political Economy* 35.3: 417-34.
- Onoh, Christian C. 1997. *Whose Coal City*. Enugu: Frontline Publishers.
- Plumwood, Val. 2003. "Decolonizing Relationships with Nature." In William M. Adams and Martin Mulligan (eds.), *Decolonizing Nature: Strategies for Conservation in a Post Colonial Era* (London: EarthScan): 44-63.
- Shell D'Arcy. 1957. "Pamphlet: Compensation for Occupation of Land in Oil Search Operations." Owerri.
- Shell Nigeria. 2006. "Shell Nigeria Annual Report." Port Harcourt.
- Shell Petroleum Development Company Rent Receipts. 1997. "The Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria: Verification of Land Owners of SPDC Egbema."

Shipton, Parker. 1994. "Land and Culture in Tropical Africa: Soils, Symbols, and the Metaphysics of the Mundane." *Annual Review of Anthropology*. 23: 347-77.

Strategy For Coal Development in 2008. Enugu: Nigerian Coal Corporation.

Thiong'o, Ngugi wa. 1972. *Homecoming: Essays on African and Caribbean Literature, Culture and Politics*. Cited in Hugh Web, *Passion Spaces: African Literature and the Post-colonial Context*. Perth: Postcolonial Press.

Uchendu, Victor Chikezie. 1978. "State, Land and Society in Nigeria: A Critical Assessment of Land Use Decree." *Journal of African Studies*. 6.2: 62-74.

Woltermann, Chris. 1992. "Privatization vs. the State." *The Free Market*. 10.1: 1-3. The Free Market Monthly. 22 February 2007. [http://mises.org/freemarket\\_detail.aspx?control=559](http://mises.org/freemarket_detail.aspx?control=559)  
[www.bpeng.org](http://www.bpeng.org) Privatization and Commercialization Policy. 12 February 2009.  
<http://www.bpeng.org/en/privatization/policy.htm>.

Zolberg, Aristide, R. 1968. "The Structure of Political Conflict in the New States of Tropical Africa." *American Political Science Review* 62.1: 70-87.