Urban Sprawl or Urban Development? Peri-Urbanism in Metropolitan Areas of Amhara Region, Ethiopia

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Abstract: In Ethiopia, rapid urbanization has been transforming land-use regimes as cities regenerate and expand, incorporating peri-urban spaces and changing their physical and human landscapes. This study explores the challenges and opportunities of this transformation on peri-urban spaces in the Amhara National Regional State (ANRS) to inform future urban development planning and practice. It focuses on selected peri-urban areas in three metropolitan areas of ANRS—Bahir Dar, Dessie, and Gondar. It employs a phenomenological approach to interpreting data collected through focus group discussion, key-informant and in-depth interviews and observation. Its findings depict these peri-urban spaces rife with poor governance, tenure insecurity, livelihood crises, youth marginalization, and environmental pollution while opportunities were limited, unsustainable, and parochial. It concludes with remarks on the characteristic experiences of urban expansion and the need for effective involvement of stakeholders and residents to enable inclusive and sustainable urban development planning and implementation in peri-urban spaces.

Key Words: peri-urbanism, urbanization, challenges, opportunities, inclusion, sustainability, Amhara

Introduction

Our world is undergoing tremendous urbanization, with almost six-fold growth between 1950 and 2018 to reach 4.2 billion people—55 percent of the global population. By 2050, 2.5 billion more people will live in urban areas, with developing countries absorbing 90 percent of this increase. This scenario will strain developing countries, which are already struggling to keep up with the rapidly growing urban populace and their needs for a decent living. Limited resources and infrastructure will undercut capacities to maximize the benefits of urbanization—
economic prosperity, cultural vitality, and social vibrancy—and minimize its dark sides—crime, unemployment, inequalities, poor health and sanitation, and environmental degradation. As urban authorities fail to adequately meet these challenges—and, compounded by such structural factors as increases in land value and population as well as limited resources—millions live in unplanned, often illegal, and shanty settlements—a constantly increasing scenario in contemporary and future urban centers. Between 2018 and 2030, the ratio of people living in informal settlements is set to increase from one in four to one in three. In Ethiopia, urbanization is a comparatively recent phenomenon and though it is lower in Ethiopia than the average for African countries (21 percent vs. 37 percent), its annual rate of increase (4.6 percent) is faster than the rate for the continent (4 percent). Existing urban centers are expanding, and new ones are emerging.

Any discussion on urbanization in Ethiopia must start by addressing the issue of land tenure systems. Historically, Ethiopia has three types of land tenure systems: the imperial system (pre-1974), the socialist system (1974-1991), and the developmental system (post-1991). The imperial land tenure system contained various arrangements, including private holding, state lands, and church lands. The king owned all land and granted ownership or use rights to individuals and institutions, which in turn (except the church) paid tributes. Inadvertently, the imperial tenure system concentrated urban and rural lands in the hands of few—aristocrats, the church, and loyalists to the crown—which increased land value in urban areas, mainly Addis Ababa, to exorbitant rates. Landlords owned and administered rural lands similar to estates in medieval Europe.

The Dergue government used socialist ideology to target this feudal system and its emergent capitalist tendencies through successive proclamations. It abolished private holding, declared land as state property, nationalized urban extra houses, and bestowed use rights upon de facto occupants. The post-1991 land tenure system, continued the socialist imprint of the Dergue era and maintained land as state property. To protect land tenure from ‘predatory’ market forces, the government prohibited private individuals from selling or exchanging land. But many neoliberal critics argued that state ownership of land had the effect of undermining tenure security, for governments as land administrators could use land as a weapon to sanction individuals for political views or endorsements. The government, on its part, cites land registration/certification that regulates its powers and protects landholders’ tenure rights. It is still contentious whether these procedures could effectively protect tenure security, for the law does not prevent land redistribution or expropriation. More importantly, post-1991 urban land laws continued to be inadequate to manage the demand emerging from rapid urbanization.

Post-1991 land laws uniformly prohibit private ownership of land but grant individuals holding rights that include the selling or exchanging of property on the land. Specifically, the 2011 Urban Land Lease Holding Proc. is the most important legal document—and “one of the most contentious”—that governs the management and administration of urban land. Proc. 721/2011 replaced Proc. 272/2002 to redress a legal loophole that allowed the free transfer of lease rights that benefited speculators and/or brokers rather than the state or its citizens. To rectify this legal loophole and take advantage of the enhanced market value of land, Proc. 721/2011 incorporated urban land into a time-bound and contractual lease system that
immediately drove land value through the roof—despite land auctions setting initial bidding prices at low rates.\textsuperscript{18}

With deepening liberalization since early 2000s, private, corporate real estate, and public agencies entered the urban housing market and generated enormous demand for land which brought rapid expansion and land-use transformation in peri-urban areas. With real estate and private developers bidding exorbitant rates to acquire land lease rights, the government vigorously identifies and expropriates expansive farmlands, wetlands, forests, and pastures on city-peripheries as well as informal settlements in cities.\textsuperscript{19} The government’s financial returns from recycling land were enormous since compensation paid to original landholders did not consider real market values.\textsuperscript{20} Proc. 721/2011 (Art. 25) permits the government to terminate landholding rights when it deems the land is of public interest, and with a weak system to ensure the adequate relocation of the evicted, many household livelihoods were destroyed or strained afterward.\textsuperscript{21} Peri-urban livelihoods and lifestyles bore pronounced and enduring effects of this process.

Though housing and other construction projects, urban agriculture created opportunities for peri-urban residents, their likelihood to derive actual benefits depends on their wealth, human capital (education), access to irrigation, and credit services.\textsuperscript{22} Studies also show the emergence of hierarchies, the concentration of poverty, and increased inequalities within peri-urban areas due to these processes.\textsuperscript{23} In Faizabad, India for instance, primary and secondary spaces arose within peri-urban areas with improved housing conditions and social amenities concentrating in the former due to their relative proximity to the city and its markets.\textsuperscript{24} These processes and their outcomes have progressively made the peri-urban populace disproportionately transitional, poorer, and prone to heightened shocks and stresses during crisis or recession.\textsuperscript{25}

With Proc. 721/2011 allowing land acquisition mainly through auction and allotment, individuals must either outbid investors or enter into cooperatives to receive land through government allotment to build residential houses. As the formal channels to acquire land become unaffordable or unforthcoming, many became squatters or informal settlement dwellers. Many others also resorted to buying peri-urban lands through an informal land market which has increasingly become the main mechanism of accessing urban land in Ethiopia and many other developing countries.\textsuperscript{26} Historically, informality attended peri-urban growth, and the inadequacy of existing legal and institutional frameworks to properly manage land-related issues amplified this aspect of rapid and horizontal urban expansion in Ethiopia.\textsuperscript{27} Ultimately, peri-urban areas become volatile spaces marred with unregulated, corrupt transactions involving government officials, landholders, investors, speculators, and brokers.\textsuperscript{28} The adequacy of legal and institutional frameworks to involve all relevant actors could be the main difference between the success and failure of urban upgrading or development programs.\textsuperscript{29} Against this backdrop, this article attempts to identify, discuss and draw insights on the processes and outcomes of urban expansion among the residents of selected peri-urban areas of the Amhara region, Ethiopia.
Peri-urban Space, Interface: Analytical Frameworks

The conventional model of rural-urban dichotomy—two distinct spaces with contrasting lifestyles, activities and orientations—though analytically useful, is increasingly untenable empirically. Specifically, the horizontal expansion of urban centers produced a new social formation, i.e., peri-urban areas that typically feature numerous socioeconomic and cultural patterns and activities that do not conform to dichotomous categories of urban and rural. The constant interchanges and overlaps between urban and rural create unique, pluralistic, and contested dynamics in peri-urban areas that require analytically powerful and empirically relevant concepts and narratives.

Rapid population increase drives peri-urbanism as a process of urban expansion that manifests in the proliferation of residential units and non-farm activities in urban fringes. With developing countries projected to absorb 90 percent of the urban population increase to 2050, peri-urbanism will continue as the topical issue in the global South. This makes exploring the challenges and prospects of peri-urbanism significant to urban policy, planning, programming, and governance.

Despite increasing literature on the subject, authors disagree on a standard definition of peri-urban, which they alternatively use to refer to: a place—geographic fringes of cities; a concept—interactions between rural and urban orientations, activities, and institutions; and, a process—a movement of people, goods, and services between urban and rural areas. Defining peri-urban as a space/place characterizes it as a midway between the rural and the urban, which is inadequate especially in the Sub-Saharan Africa context where peri-urban areas remain predominantly agrarian. Thus, it is conceptually and empirically powerful to study the peri-urban as a system of structures and institutions that are “simultaneously sustained and imperiled by the dynamics of the urban economy,” rather than simply as a geographic place. Ultimately, we have two alternative conceptualizations of peri-urban: place- and flows-based approaches.

The flows-based approach to peri-urbanism emphasizes “the flows of produce, finance, labor and services” between urban and rural areas that underpin “the processes of rapid economic, sociological, institutional and environmental changes.” The peri-urban is socially heterogeneous and fluid that challenges its institutions, where authorities and residents face the demands of shifting boundaries. Activities may lay outside the strictly urban or the strictly rural, producing contentious, conflictive politics between groups. A careful and systematic blending of place- and flows-based approaches to the study of peri-urbanism nonetheless has the advantage of enabling a comprehensive understanding of peri-urban areas over adopting either approach. The place-based approach will provide the empirical and spatial framework of the peri-urban as a location where people experience prosperity and deprivation due to the forces of rapid urbanization. On the other hand, the flows-based approach helps us tap into the dynamic and multifaceted interactions between rural and urban areas, activities, people, goods, and services that produce opportunities, exclusions, resistance, contestations, and challenges.

Blending place- and flow- approaches to studying the rapid expansion of towns and cities of the global South unravels a regulatory void which created and perpetuated institutional disruptions and cultural contestations in peri-urban areas. Urban and rural laws and institutions maintain overlapping jurisdictions over peri-urban areas to create “legal
pluralism.” Most urban and rural authorities do not have much history of collaborative planning and administration which leaves peri-urban residents to suffer from lack of regulation, double standards, or failure of authorities to provide physical and social services. Researchers have identified several reasons to explain this scenario: peri-urban residents are unofficial or semi-legal; urban authorities cannot cope with the demand for services; urban and rural authorities do not have clear roles and jurisdictions; and authorities lack the capacity to enforce laws and provide services.

Current peri-urban realities, nonetheless, exist within broader structures and forces including state ideology, development politics, and globalization. Laws, regulations, and programs invoke the conventional urban-rural dichotomy and opposition, though more and more literature on urban policy and planning underscores significant complexities, pluralities, and dynamism in peri-urban areas. Allen, for instance, argued that “planning and management in the peri-urban interface cannot simply be based on the extrapolation of planning approaches and tools applied in rural and urban areas.” They need a unique approach that systematically brings the rural, regional and urban planning elements into a socially inclusive and environmentally sustainable whole. This requires a paradigm shift in planning and institutional setups. It is urgent and necessary not only to peri-urban areas but also to rural and urban areas due to their growing functional interlinkages.

In the context of this study, the works of Browder and colleagues are insightful. They identified four key themes to explore structural, institutional, and spatial factors within the urban-rural interface: (a) agriculture and rural linkages; (b) informal economy; (c) conflictive land property ownership issues; and (d) demographics of fringe development. Through a hermeneutic-phenomenological approach, this study uses these themes to explore and situate peri-urban residents’ experiences in the Amhara region within the international context, especially the global South, as a scenario. The study areas are typically peri-urban where the urban and the rural meet “characterized by a transformation of economic activities from agriculture-based livelihoods into non-farming occupations.” They are increasingly assuming the role of linking the urban with the rural, and blending the features of both worlds, albeit tenuously. The effects of the urban on peri-urban spaces include changes in land-use and diversity in residents’ socioeconomic profiles, demographic transition, and proliferation of urban structures, activities, and lifestyles—outcomes indicating emergent traits of urbanism. Their proximity to the rural with its natural resources and agrarian culture influence their development and character as well.

It is against this backdrop that this study explores residents’ shared experiences on the processes, challenges, and opportunities of peri-urbanism in three cities of the Amhara region (Bahir Dar, Dessie, and Gondar) that grew enormously before and after incorporating their adjoining agrarian communities as ‘rural sub-cities.’ Urban policy-makers, planners, and residents could use the findings of this study to facilitate and inform evidence-based public discussions, identify effective and feasible strategies, and implement inclusive programming on urban land use and governance.
Study Area

The Amhara National Regional State is one of the ten regions and two city administrations that make up the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. In 2017, the region had a projected population of 22 million, with 17.4 percent residing in urban areas. The region’s three metropolitan areas—Bahir Dar, Dessie, and Gondar—had projected 2017 populations of 360,600, 362,297, and 245,129 respectively, making them medium-sized cities or towns.

In 2018, small- and medium-sized cities and towns constituted 48 percent of the global urban population, and, in the next few decades, they will grow at a much faster rate than large cities. In other words, urban centers of developing countries like Ethiopia and small- and medium-towns like Bahir Dar, Dessie, and Gondar will experience a rapid increase in population, built-up area, and urban activities and orientation in their fringes. These processes and their challenges and opportunities will undoubtedly dominate discourses on development policy and urban planning into the foreseeable future. By exploring the outcomes of rapid urban expansion from the point of view of peri-urbanites in the three cities (in terms of socioeconomic and land-use changes and environmental impacts), this study aims to promote inclusive policy forums and adequate urban planning and programming.

This study covered six peri-urban sub-cities in Bahir Dar, Dessie, and Gondar metropolitan areas: Zenzelima and Addis Alem (Bahir Dar); Boru and Titfa (Dessie); Bejajig-Dabiraq and Azezo TekleHaymanot (Gondar). These peri-urban areas are officially referred to as ‘rural sub-city’ courtesy of their recent incorporation into the three metropolitan area master plans. The authors purposively selected the six peri-urban areas after conducting preliminary observations, desk-review, and stakeholder consultations in the three metropolitan areas that revealed visible impacts of urban expansion on their settlement and residents. The same land laws—federal and regional—govern the six peri-urban areas, and they are home to people of broadly similar socioeconomic, cultural, and demographic attributes. On the other hand, they also manifest diverse characteristics among each other. Accordingly, the authors used a set of criteria—distance from city centers, population size, infrastructure development, and community activism/organization—to identify and select six peri-urban areas that represent the diversity of the Amhara region.

As this is a phenomenological study, its findings and conclusions are primarily and cautiously applicable to peri-urban areas with similar attributes. The authors caution against the unqualified application of its statements as the generalizability of the reported findings would require robust data the current study does not claim to provide. But the study is not incomparably unique; it used internationally validated analytical constructs to describe and interpret core themes generated from the qualitative data to understand peri-urban connections and disruptions. Its findings, thus, provide insights into the particularities and similarities of peri-urbanism in the global South by highlighting the six peri-urban areas as cases.
Methods and Procedures

This study employed a hermeneutic-phenomenological approach to analyzing and interpreting qualitative data collected through focus group discussion (FGD), key informant interview (KII), in-depth interview (IDI), and unstructured observation. The FGD, KII, and IDI guides were designed in English first and then translated into Amharic, the federal (Ethiopia), and regional (Amhara) working language spoken by residents of the six peri-urban areas. The authors used Amharic to conduct discussions and interviews and, with the informed consent of participants,
they audio-recorded the sessions. The audio recordings were then transcribed verbatim and translated into English.

Key themes organized the description and interpretation of peri-urban residents’ adjustment, resistance, or resignation to their tenuous integration into the urban space. Within the hermeneutic-phenomenological tradition, this study identifies rapid urban expansion as an ‘abiding concern’ that manifests itself in expropriation/eviction, tenure insecurity, livelihood crisis, adjustment, and resistance. Though this study may read as a description of peri-urbanism in metropolitan areas of the Amhara region, its approach formulates interpretations through the mediation of varied lived experiences of peri-urban residents and forwards narratives that promote better understanding and inclusive urban policy and planning.

Primary data came from six FGD, twelve KII, eighteen IDI, and unstructured observation (evenly distributed among the six peri-urban areas). To account for diverse voices in peri-urban areas, the authors developed socio-demographic profiling to recruit FGD participants—displaced, not displaced, women, men, and youth. As land-related issues are sensitive, the authors engaged representatives of youth associations, housing cooperatives, and community leaders to develop rapport with the study population. With their consultations, a pool of potential participants was identified, contacted, and briefed on the purpose and information management ethics issues. Candidates willing to take part in the study became FGD participants and were brought to a venue convenient for all. Key informants, on the other hand, were recruited for their knowledge and expertise on land management, challenges, and opportunities in peri-urban areas. Urban planners, city administrators, land acquisition and transfer officers, and chairpersons of housing cooperatives were potential informants for the study. In each of the six peri-urban areas, two KII were conducted. For IDI, three interviewees from every peri-urban area shared their experiences of peri-urbanism. The authors ensured these interviewees represented diverse views and experiences in their communities using peri-urban population typologies: farmers (displaced, not displaced, model), female entrepreneurs, and youth, among others. Furthermore, the authors explored the physical, socioeconomic, and environmental landscapes of peri-urban areas using an observation checklist with generic indicators of community wellbeing and sustainability.

For data analysis, the authors uploaded the English versions of FGD, KII, and IDI transcripts onto Atlas.ti 8. The authors thoroughly read each transcript and developed Codes In Vivo, which facilitated conceptual coding and their grouping into code families, i.e., themes. In extracting themes from numerous codes, the authors drew on Browder’s conceptualization of peri-urbanism as a process, as discussed in the introduction section. Within the hermeneutic-phenomenological approach, the authors employed thematic and content analyses procedures to organize, describe and interpret narratives of residents’ experiences and present an illustrative case of peri-urbanism.

**Challenges of Peri-urbanism**

From study participants’ typical narratives, the authors identified main themes to organize and present findings on the challenges of rapid urban expansion in peri-urban areas: governance, land tenure security, livelihood status, youth participation, and environmental protection.
Governance

Good governance has been central to countries’ performances both on Millennium Development Goals (MDG) and Sustainable Development Goals (SDG). It featured prominently in the post-2015 development discourses that, for instance, identified dimensions of governance as the most significant factor. In Ethiopia, the Urban Good Governance Package of the Ministry of Works and Urban Development (MWUD), drawing from the international development agendas, provides the basis for good governance practices. The MWUD reported that though main elements of the institutional framework (policies, laws, regulations) are in place, a lot remains to harness organizational capacities that ensure good urban governance. Poor governance practices continue to threaten Ethiopian urban centers’ inclusivity and sustainability. One area where this is a pertinent challenge is in the administration of urban land.

Relevant land laws dictate that land management and expropriation should involve all stakeholders during the process. However, landholders lamented the lack of transparency in the platforms to discuss and negotiate the terms of land expropriation with the government. Furthermore, they also underlined how rarely officials consult with landholders regarding the land expropriation process, timeline, compensation scheme, plans on their relocation and land-use changes, etc. An FGD participant at Belajig-Dabirqa (Gondar) explained how, when officials organize discussion forums, they utilize various means to persuade landowners to agree to the terms of land expropriation:

During one discussion, officials told us that each household head and children above 18 would receive a 500m² plot to build a house – as part of the agreement to leave our ancestral lands. 500m² per head! They also said the compensation would be sufficient to sustain our families for 10 years. We all signed the minutes of the discussion…Then they leased our land to the highest bidding investors…We later received only a fraction of the compensation promised. They unilaterally opted out of securing plots for building a house too.

He added,

We established a committee to draw attention to our grievances. We approached the municipality and land administration departments, among others. We even hired a lawyer to represent our cause. All to no avail!! When some officials started accusing the committee of organizing and inciting conflict against the government, we dropped everything. Can you imagine what the government might do if they believed we are politically motivated?!

A key informant interviewee at Gondar municipality underlined that the city has clear guidelines on land administration to handle expropriation and compensation very seriously. However, the process does not guarantee satisfaction for all involved. He adds, from his experience in organizing community meetings with landholders,

[Most] Landholders usually [have primordial attachments to their land and] are resistant to leave their land when we ask them to. Most refuse to come to community meetings, assuming attendance would be construed as a tacit agreement to leave their land. When decisions are reached [through these
meetings], they are the ones who usually complain about the procedure and its outcomes.⁶⁰

The frustration of parties on either side of the aisle needs to be seen in a historical context. Despite existing legal provisions, fair compensation for expropriated land (as well as property on and livelihood from the land) and effective participation of landholders have not been a strong suit of Ethiopian governments.⁶¹ Under the imperial government, land was acquired, allotted, or redistributed at the king’s will; and the Dergue nationalized all land and put its administration under a strictly centralized planning agency. Post-1991, land still remains under state control and the terms of expropriation depended on its discretion as per its definition of priorities and public interest. Municipalities of the three cities seem to reduce—as many study participants claim—landholders to insignificant participants in land administration meetings. In several cases, landholders claim to have signed expropriation agreements without having relevant and sufficient information on compensation schemes or future land development plans. The expropriated landholders resented the process: their source of livelihood changed hands and they were forced to experiment with different lifestyles to cope with new challenges or resist deprivation.

With many peri-urban residents less educated and less informed on land laws, officials carried out questionable land expropriations. For instance, though the law clearly states expropriation orders should be issued ninety days in advance, expropriations proceeded “at will and with unreasonably short timelines,” an FGD discussant at Azezo-TekleHaymanot (Gondar) claimed.⁶² In a few cases, study participants at Addis Alem (Bahir Dar) reported, land expropriation processes started covertly and without landholders’ knowledge, which ended in their forced evacuation or demolition of the property. Several studies report corruption in urban land management, which could explain why officials engage in clandestine land transfer to investors without considering its effects on landholder wellbeing.⁶³

Furthermore, most land expropriations happened before compensations, or temporary/permanent replacement plots were made ready to landholders. In Bahir Dar for instance, discussants claimed they were removed from their lands while preparing for cultivation, which was then fenced for auction.⁶⁴ But for several months, those plots were still not transferred to investors. Many landholders contested their land expropriation, but only a few won the litigation and reclaimed their lands. Their lot did not significantly improve however, as they could not cultivate the land having sold or consumed their seeds during expropriation. For others, “by the time we received compensation, trees, and coffee trees on the land that were shrubs [when expropriated] had grown full-sizes, and their market value increased significantly. But our compensations were the same as years ago.”⁶⁵ This amounts to participants’ characterization of the system and its operations as unfair and a manifestation of poor governance. When asked about landholders’ delayed compensations, an urban planning and construction expert at Bahir Dar accepted that the complaint may have some truth but stressed the protracted nature of land transfers as the main reason:

We handle land expropriation and transfer seriously. But a single lawsuit puts the whole process on hold for all involved. We cannot move forward with the process [transfer land to investors, compensate landholders, etc.] until the court reaches a verdict…After winning their bids, furthermore, some investors take time to start
developing their plots. That is why you may see fenced and undeveloped lands plots in and around the city.66

Speculators, among others, are the undesirable byproducts of the lack of institutional frameworks to manage peri-urban land effectively. Formally or informally, they acquire land in peri-urban areas and expect to benefit from price increase in the future.67 Instead of developing their lands, they fence it off and invest the bare minimum and maintain a façade of legitimacy for their acquisition. They cite delays in acquiring credits from the bank or price hikes in construction equipment which, in the eyes of peri-urbanites, cannot justify their rushed expropriation. Peri-urban residents see this as a sign of poor governance and grew frustrated with how all parties gloss over their predicaments. An FGD discussant at Addis Alem (Bahir Dar) explains,

Researchers, officials, and others came and asked us questions about many things, including land expropriation. But we rarely hear back from them. None took action to improve our lots either. We are fatigued and confused with the purpose of these discussions. We do not know who will address our concerns...The problems with our municipality are unbelievable. We have lost hope that anyone can solve our problems.68

With significant disruptions, there is confusion on whether urban or rural authorities administer the various aspects of peri-urban areas.69 Jurisdictions are clear when it comes to the administration of rural and urban areas. But as urban centers expand and incorporate peri-urban agrarian settlements into their masterplans, the matter becomes less clear. Peri-urban areas represent a tenuous admixture of socioeconomic patterns and lifestyles, and the lack of adequate governance structure to manage them has created profound administrative challenges. Urban, rural, and peri-urban authorities vie for control over peri-urban areas’ environmental protection, land management, property administration, etc., forging an ambiguous status for peri-urban spaces. For example, urban authorities prohibit building houses on ‘peri-urban lands’ that they incorporate into their masterplans, though they are characteristically agrarian. They continuously and rapidly redefine tenure relations in peri-urban spaces, making their single-most valuable resource—land—a terrain of contestation for speculators, investors, landholders, and authorities themselves. The law remains unclear about their character and administration. Urban centers continue to incorporate peri-urban areas and impose land-use regulations that do not resonate with the peri-urban landscape. For instance, city municipalities incorporate rural land into their masterplans, classify it as urban, and refuse rights to construct houses for residence or work. Peri-urban areas experience ‘legal pluralism’ or regulatory void that features in much of peri-urban areas in the global South.70

Tenure Security

Urban expansion grows out of unmet demands for residential, commercial, and industrial land in the urban populace. As municipalities in the Amhara region respond to this demand by incorporating their fringes into masterplans, they subject peri-urban residents to large-scale expropriations that neglect their land rights. This scenario produces a heightened sense of tenure insecurity among peri-urban residents, which is not unique to the Amhara region.71 In Tiffa (Dessie), an FGD discussant shared the fear of many peri-urban residents:


https://asq.africa.ufl.edu/files/V21i1a1.pdf
The city has not taken our lands, yet. But we constantly worry that one day could be the day for us to move. We learned from others that we might not know when it could happen or where we will go. We are not opposed to the development of our city, but we wish it won’t be at our families’ expense. We hope the government would save a fraction of the attention it gives to investors to promote the welfare of its constituencies.62

Another FGD participant adds, “the city served many landholders with sudden expropriation orders. It evicted a few others from their lands prepared for sowing.” Like Addis Alem (Bahir Dar), the Dessie municipality court listened to residents’ complaints and reversed several land expropriation decisions due to unmet legal and procedural expectations. However, due to the protracted litigation process, the court’s intervention came late for many who had sold or consumed their planting seeds to subsist, thus deepening their livelihood crisis.

These circumstances undermine peri-urban residents’ trust in the land administration system and heighten their sense of tenure insecurity. Experiencing tenure insecurity and being legally prohibited from selling land, many opt to sell their farmlands via the informal market, fueling the rapid proliferation of informal settlements in the three cities. But the buyers are not necessarily poor households that cannot afford land for housing in the inner city.63 Study participants identified a list of actors: speculators who buy farmlands at a lower price to benefit from an increased land value in the future; residents of government-subsidized houses; and well-to-do families that opt to invest in the housing market. Tenure insecurity drives these processes and fuels the prominence of the informal land market and settlements in peri-urban areas that leads to environmental degradation, loss of farmland, corruption, and land-related conflicts.64 In the global South more broadly, the problem of tenure security in peri-urban areas has made informal land markets the way for many people to access land.65

Nonetheless, the demand-side of the land market did not unilaterally drive the rapid, continuous, and unplanned transformation of the peri-urban landscape. The government has played its part by restricting legal avenues for residents to acquire land for housing, preferring auctions to allocation as the market value of land increases, especially after Proc. 711/2011. Land auctions generate millions to city governments, and deprived residents (including speculators) responded by selling or buying peri-urban land via the informal market.

The growing peri-urban land tenure insecurity has led to frequent and severe conflicts among informal settlers, farmers, investors, and the government. An FGD participant at Azezo TekleHaymanot (Gondar) shared her experience:

Despite what was said, the compensation plan was very inadequate. Some farmers [declined the city’s offer and] sold their plots in the informal market. When officials came to formalize the process, they needed the police to quell the resistance of ‘illegal settlers’ who bought the land from the farmers. On one occasion, two policemen died in a shootout involving these ‘illegal settlers.”66

On several occasions, the city could not process plots allotted to resident housing cooperatives due to farmers’ refusal to accept the city’s compensation offers. The landholders declined the city’s compensation offers and on many occasions threatened to use any means available to keep plots in their possession. A few of these cases had to go to court. Others forced the city to initiate a new round of dialogue with landholders. Only a handful managed to find an amicable
solution; and many have increasingly relied—in a similar fashion as in the rest of the global South—on traditional institutions and dispute settlement strategies.77

Youth Participation

Studies show that rapid urbanization in the global South has rarely been a participatory process, negatively impacting peri-urban residents’ wellbeing, and resilience.78 Participants also claimed municipalities of the three cities neglected peri-urban youth, especially concerning their displacement-induced transitions. That city plans and initiatives were not adequate or inclusive meant they affected and forced youth to live in poverty, desperation, and hopelessness—or resort to outmigration.

The marginalization of peri-urban youth manifests in different ways. FGD participants identified growing landlessness and joblessness among youth due mainly to rapid urban expansion. As farmlands are expropriated or sold in the informal market, most peri-urban youths become increasingly unable to make a living for themselves. On the other hand, a handful of youth closer to the urban center found jobs or opportunities to earn income. But these opportunities are limited due to restrictions on building facilities for urban agriculture and difficulties in accessing financial services for entrepreneurial engagements. According to study participants, this shows how officials are mainly concerned about land acquisition but not about the wellbeing of peri-urban families and their youth. As a result, most young people in peri-urban areas engage in odd jobs—casual labor, stone extraction, chat trading, etc.

The urban land management and governance system compound this problem of peri-urban youth. Urban land laws restrict building extra houses on peri-urban land included in the city master-plan and limit livelihood diversification through poultry production or catering services. Though urban expansion promises demand for peri-urban products, the legal restrictions make it impossible for residents to venture into off-farm income generating activities. As FGD discussants underlined, this primarily affects the landless youth who frequently retreat to drug abuse (mainly alcohol and chat) and self-destructive behaviors.

Field observation identified significantly high numbers of shanty pubs, chat kiosks, and pool houses crowded with people of all ages but mainly youth. Not only peri-urban youth frequent these facilities. They are also populated by those who migrate from the rural hinterland searching for work in urban centers but choose peri-urban areas as transitional spaces for their cheaper cost of living. The continual presence of a transient population, limited opportunities to make a decent living, the abundance of high-risk places, weakened ties to families and resources, fill peri-urban areas with challenges and risks to youth development. Consequently, peri-urban youth focus on finding a way to move out of the locality by any means available, making them vulnerable to human trafficking and exploitation.

Urban planners share peri-urban residents’ concerns, but they also aired their frustrations with the residents’ unwillingness to plan, adapt and pursue a positive lifestyle. A key-informant (Bahir Dar) says,

We provide different programs as part of land expropriation and compensation scheme. We provide training to build farmers’ capacities to utilize their compensations with foresight. But many spend their compensation money
extravagantly on weddings, social events, family ceremonies, etc. It is unreasonable to ask the government to be responsible for everyone.79

Regarding youth engagement, he adds, “There are youth centers in peri-urban areas that register unemployed youth, provide them with training and organize them for contract-based public works. Not all unemployed youth are registered and, those who complain about the lack of opportunities could be these.”

On the other hand, there are financial schemes available for peri-urban youth, administered initially as a youth safety net program, to borrow funds and launch their businesses. Recently however, these schemes were restructured and require permanent address and collateral that most youth cannot meet. Peri-urban residents see these preconditions as untenable, for evicted families and youth cannot provide permanent address or collateral. Conversely, government officials insist that the preconditions are necessary to ensure public funds are appropriately used and repaid in due time by beneficiaries. Consequently, most beneficiaries of the financial scheme have come from well-to-do families who can guarantee their solvency. This situation has created a cycle of deprivation and marginalization, especially among the poor peri-urban youth whose futures become bleaker by the day.

Livelihood Systems

As urban areas expand, they transform farmlands into residential, industrial, or commercial spaces. Peri-urban residents are mainly farmers, and this process affects their livelihoods. Expropriation forces them to abandon farming and relocate, throwing them into a contrasting lifestyle. With limited resources and government support, many failed to transition from farming to off-farm occupations and create a sustainable livelihood. This study found the sprawling urban economy created fewer off-farm employment options for peri-urban residents. Study participants also noted how peri-urban residents are engaging more in low-paid, casual, and low-skill jobs like security-guard, daily labor, cleaning, or housekeeping.

An inclusive and sustainable urban development policy requires an effective, participatory, fair, and transparent land management system. But this system is lacking in the Amhara region resulting in significant livelihood crises in peri-urban areas. Peri-urban areas incorporation into city master plans did not come with required situational analyses and planning. Urban centers are sprawling beyond the administrative capacities of the municipalities to regulate landholding rights. As a result, more informal settlements emerge in peri-urban areas, redefining the urban landscape. These informal settlements are integrating with the urban economy without being legal or sustainable. Study participants consistently claimed that compensation amounts for farmlands were meager, considering the outcome was a permanent loss of an entire household’s livelihood. For farmers, a ‘trifling’ compensation amount or its non-productive usage severely affected their economic wellbeing. For instance, an FGD participant at Gondar comments:

We heard compensations paid for [expropriated] land are good; but when we finally receive it, it was only marginal. They [the Municipality] took our land by force, not through negotiated terms of agreement. There was violence, resulting in injury and death…We don’t have an idea for what purpose they intend to use our land [either].80
The average compensation for one hectare of farmland in 2017 varied from 40,000ETB (Gondar) and 50,000ETB (Dessie) to 70,000ETB (Bahir Dar). The government determines land compensation amounts as “ten times the average annual income secured during the five years preceding the expropriation.” However, study participants claimed this procedure is iniquitous. First, the multiplying factor of ten is unfair, for rural landholding right is for a lifetime. Second, compensation amounts should reflect the increasing value of land and the declining purchasing power of Ethiopian Birr due to high inflation. Third, there is a huge gap between what the government receives from investors through leasing and what farmers receive from the government for the same plot of land. Fourth, as a permanent asset, land supports generations of families through old age, which the cash compensation formula did not consider. Fifth, compensation amounts based on the current price of crops do not consider the rapidly increasing cost of living. More importantly, compensation amounts were insignificant considering the large rural families and shifts in the orientation they must achieve to create a sustainable livelihood. The insufficiency of compensation to landholders has been noted in several similar studies.

Moreover, study participants report that compensations are rarely paid immediately after expropriation. Payments could delay for months or even years with implications for household subsistence. With high inflation and increasing cost of living, each passing day decreases the actual value of compensation payments, an FGD discussant laments:

When the city took our lands, we did not have sufficient time to put our affairs in order. They [the Municipality] rashly evicted us before giving our compensations...By the time they transferred our payments to our bank accounts, things were already different. For example, the calculated compensation amount for trees on our lands during expropriation was significantly lower than what we could have received if the estimation was made now [when we received the payment]. The trees have grown to full-size, but we received the rate fixed when they were just shrubs. They did not consider the relative value of property and assets.

An Urban Planning and Construction expert at Gondar explains that the delays could be due to ongoing legal cases that some landholders lodged in the court against the city. When land expropriation complaints go to court, the city could not do anything, he adds. The only option is to pause the process and follow the official protocol in handling the landholding rights under question. In addition, acquiring plots of lands to resettle expropriated landholders had also taken more time than anticipated, which may delay paying compensation. He adds, though sometimes unavoidable, the city does not prolong delays more than what is necessary to ensure everyone’s satisfaction in the process.

Environmental Protection

Sustainable development encompasses three components necessary for decent human existence: economic growth, social justice, and environmental protection. Specifically, the preservation of the environment is reiterated in MDGs (MDG-7) and SDGs (mainly SDGs 12, 13, 14, and 15). The Ethiopian Constitution has also provided that the government needs “to ensure [that] all Ethiopians live in a clean and healthy environment.” This process requires urban planning to
be environmentally conscious. Urban expansion, however, outstripped planning for adequate and effective environmental protection, resulting in environmental degradation and loss of aesthetic values in peri-urban areas. This scenario has been reported extensively by the study participants. Using structured observation, the authors noted common incidents of environmental pollution in the study areas. Inadequate waste management systems have led to liquid waste flowing from cities to peri-urban areas, polluting air and water. For example, Wollo University and Bahir Dar University (Agricultural Campus) dispose of polluting latrine waste onto the surrounding open waters and rivers in their respective peri-urban areas of Boru and Zenzelima. The Bahir Dar City municipality dumps dry-waste in an estimated one-hectare open space at Addis Alem. In Zenzelima, plastic bags, bottles, and household wastes are discarded in the open.

Liquid and solid city wastes have been polluting the groundwater and rivers in peri-urban areas, exacerbating the scarcity of potable water for residents. Despite their incorporation into city masterplans, municipalities do not well avail peri-urban residents of proper urban amenities and services. Compounding this problem is the growing migrant population in peri-urban areas who come searching for affordable housing. Mushrooming peri-urban households and housing projects fueled the competition for water supply for household and construction uses. Inner-city informal areas share much of the peri-urban environmental challenges, which shows the urgency to make urban spaces and livelihoods sustainable. As noted previously, however, municipalities lack in planning and implementing inclusive, participatory, and sustainable urban development programming.

**Opportunities of Peri-urbanism**

Well-managed cities and towns create market demands and remittances for the rural economy; foster entrepreneurship, economic modernization, and diversification; and reduce poverty by offering a labor market, higher earning capacity/opportunity, and better access to services. Historically, they are known for their vibrancy, diversity of human interactions and communication, creative thinking, and scientific and technological advancements. The incorporation of peri-urban areas into city masterplans, in principle, should then avail them the best of both worlds: urban amenities (infrastructure and services—electricity, schools, health centers, water supply, urban markets) and rural resources (access to cheap labor, cheaper resources). This study, however, found that the process did not bring the benefits of urbanization to peri-urban residents while producing loss of farmlands, livelihood, degradation of the environment, etc. These outcomes are intimately linked to peri-urban areas’ ambivalent structural location, mismanagement, and weak integration into urban spaces and lifestyles. As a result, relatively few peri-urban residents could take advantage of their proximity to the urban market and secure decent off-farm employment. Many were only able to engage in construction projects and informal trading.

On the other hand, not all peri-urban residents were expropriated, deprived, and marginalized. There were a few ‘model farmers’ who took advantage of peri-urbanism by engaging in urban agriculture—e.g. beekeeping, dairy or poultry farming, and animal fattening. ‘Model farmers’ adapted to changing circumstances and benefited from the
alternative government schemes to venture into new projects for diversifying their livelihood sources. As in many other development ventures, these model farmers are usually better off in their communities and with resources to make their ‘experiments’ work, which raised a question on inclusivity of the process.

Peri-urban spaces suit urban agriculture, fitting their transitional character and aligning well with their emerging environmental priorities and lifestyle preferences. Their proximity to the urban center and rural hinterland position them uniquely to benefit from broad consumer markets, reduced costs of packaging, storing, or transporting products as well as labor and land-rent. In principle, urban agriculture propels farmers’ transition from extensive to intensive agriculture that uses improved seeds and livestock and promotes product quality and market flexibility. But most peri-urban residents could not achieve this transition due to the inadequate government support to create blended livelihoods through ensuring tenure security, providing relevant training, and creating access to credits and financial services. According to study respondents, if these supports—especially tenure security against random expropriation—were availed to peri-urban residents, it would have encouraged increased investment that boosts production and returns.

A resident of Azezo-TekleHaymanot shared her experience on benefiting from the growing market for her products—honey, poultry, and dairy products. But the observation of another model farmer at Azezo TekleHaymanot sheds light on the differential integration of peri-urban residents into the urban economy. For him and a few others engaged in animal fattening in the peri-urban locality near urban centers, their incorporation brought urban demands for their products to their doorstep, which they exploited effectively. He said that the proximity to urban centers helped him acquire relevant information about the urban market and the demand and value for his goods, which he adapted to and accrued financial benefits. He adds, however, most farmers living far from the urban centers sold their farm animals after expropriation since they did not know how to engage in animal fattening or urban agriculture.

Farmers often lack the skills to determine the investment of their compensation payments on urban agriculture or otherwise, which is the drawback of the land expropriation management system. Development agents promote new technologies and best practices among farmers, yet these do not necessarily bring significant improvements to the life chances of many peri-urban residents. This outcome may be due to the methods promoted being foreign to farmers’ life-worlds and production systems. Furthermore, discussants and interviewees claimed that municipalities deter local entrepreneurship in peri-urban areas. The majority of peri-urban residents, save those model farmers, face challenges in accessing finance to purchase improved inputs or obtaining construction permits to expand their businesses. The urban agriculturalist who engages in beekeeping and poultry production, for instance, recounted her challenge in securing municipality permits to construct shades for her expanding business. Municipalities restrict beekeeping and poultry farming on reclassified urban land which had hitherto been rural.

Conclusion

Through exploring six peri-urban areas in the Amhara region, this study unraveled residents’ experiences of a characteristically rapid urban expansion. Study participants and authors’
observations identified more challenges than opportunities for peri-urban residents; and, pressing challenges include poor governance, administrative vacuum/pluralism, land tenure insecurity, livelihood crises, youth disempowerment, and environmental pollution. Although very few benefited from urban agriculture, opportunities of urban expansion have not come as advertised for several; nor were they effectively utilized due to governance, skills, and capital limitations.

Addressing the challenges and harnessing opportunities of peri-urbanism requires a system built on collaboration amongst municipalities, landholders, residents, investors, and relevant stakeholders with the shared agenda of creating peri-urban livelihood resilience through promoting indigenous knowledge and innovation, harnessing skills and entrepreneurial acumen, and enabling popular participation especially among the youth. Peri-urban residents’ effective participation in a range of land administration issues is paramount to ensure the inclusivity of land expropriation, transfer, development processes. But there are broad structural issues resistant to efforts at taming the effects of urban sprawl. Dichotomous urban-rural landholding laws have produced unstable property systems in peri-urban areas where land is subject to largely compulsory land acquisitions. Furthermore, incorporating peri-urban areas into city masterplans have not created significant connections between urban, peri-urban, and rural spaces and activities. Instead, this process fostered more disruptions in the social fabric and economic wellbeing of mainly peri-urban residents. With peri-urban residents’ strong ‘aristocratic’ attachments to land and possession of firearms, relationships among squatters, farmers, speculators, the government have become fluid and increasingly volatile. Lack of clear expropriation and compensation regulations, inadequate attention to farmers due to an urban-oriented approach and limited farmers’ involvement in these processes, on the one hand, and the inadequacy of existing institutional frameworks to amicably resolve ensuing land-related disputes, on the other, have made peri-urban areas prone to significant disruptions and sometimes open violence.

Municipalities lack institutional recourses to deal with mushrooming informal settlements within their peri-urban landscapes. They do not recognize the citizens’ right to land for housing and their investments on land bought illegally from farmers. Municipality land regulations dictate these peoples’ removal from informally acquired land, but residents have grown militant over the years. As municipalities delay interventions, their relationships with squatters grow tenuous and the latter expand in number and solidarity with the inertia in their favor. Simple and rigid application of the law would not cost human lives and hard-earned livelihood and property. Municipalities must start appreciating the seriousness of the situation and enter into broad-based discussions with the squatters, residents, farmers, and investors to negotiate procedures, regulations, and amicable solutions. The outcome of the process may not necessarily make everyone involved happy, but enabling a participatory approach to the problem will give municipalities the much-needed legitimacy to make the urbanization process sustainable and inclusive. In a scenario where citizens view officials as largely ineffective or unwilling, unilateral municipality decisions are not only a poor fit to managing the complexity of urban sprawl in peri-urban areas, they also entail a missed opportunity to engage residents in building inclusive cities.
References


Notes

1 See Mahabir et al. 2016; UNDESA 2018.
2 UNDESA 2018.
3 UNDESA 2018.
4 See Pankhurst 1990; Crummey 2000; Crummey (1976) cited in Bahru-Zewde 2008: 486; Molla 2009; UNHabitat 2008, 2010; CIA 2019. Some authors (e.g., Molla (2009) wrote that pre-20th century Ethiopia had a totalistic and self-sufficient agrarian lifestyle that contradicted
emergent tendencies of urbanization – a process that requires the transfer of land and labor from agriculture to industry and urban services.

6 For instance, Pankhurst (1966: 154) writes, in 1961, the first reliable survey of Addis Ababa estimated that 6.7% of its population held 58% of its land. Others (e.g., Mesfin 1970:25; Cohen and Koehn 1977:25) reported, in 1966, 5% of its residents owned 95% of the city’s land. Between the 1950s and 1970s, Clapham (1988:50) claims, this process accounted for the increase in land value by over 1000%.
7 The Dergue, Amharic parlance meaning ‘Committee,’ is a military Marxist-Leninist leadership that assumed political power following the 1974 Peoples’ Revolution and ruled the country until the EPRDF-led coalition removed it in 1991.
9 1995 FDRE Constitution (Article 40.3).
11 See Olika 2006; Crewett and Korf 2008.
12 Deininger et al. 2007; Palm 2010.
13 See Rahmato 2009a; Solomon 2020, p. 46.
14 Rahmato 2009b.
16 Ambaye 2015, p. 55.
18 Proc. 721/2011 (Article 16, 17). In Gondar, for instance, even if official initial bids of 250-300ETB per square meter were set for land in city peripheries, they went for bids exceeding 20,000ETB per square meter. The increase in lease price was noticeable in the year following the entry to force of Proc. 721/2011. In Addis Ababa, actual lease prices went as high as 3-4 times the ‘lease benchmark price.’ See Ambaye 2015, p. 80.
19 Rahmato 2011.
20 van Dijk 2009; Adam 2011; Tura 2018; Wubneh 2018.
21 Wegedie 2018.
22 Demie and Zeray 2016.
24 Sadaf 2020.
27 Allen et al. 2006; Gabriel 2016; Lombard 2016; Torres et al. 2007.
28 Solomon 2020, p. 46.
29 See Nuhu 2019; Jelili et al. 2020. In Tanzania, Nuhu (2019) identified lack of adequate procedures to involve all actors that led to dissonance, resistance, and conflict among excluded actors and ultimately undermined the success and fairness of urban development programs. In Nigeria, Jelili et al. (2020) discussed the success of redevelopment programs that promoted active solicitation and participation of residents.
30 Jones and Visaria (1997) explain this shift as representing a focus on exchanges and flows between urban and rural activities and engagements rather than the contrast between ‘high-density core’ vs. ‘low-density periphery’.
31 Jones and Visaria 1997.
32 UNDESA 2018.
35 For example, Iaquinta and Drescher 2000; Friedberg 2001; Samantha 2001; Allen 2003; Halkatti et al. 2003; Cadéne 2005; Dupont 2005; Narain and Nischal 2007.
36 Halkatti et al. 2003, p. 149.
37 Narain and Nischal 2007, p. 262.
38 Narain and Nischal 2007, p. 262.
40 See Friedberg 2001; Simon et al. 2003; Satterthwaite 2007.
42 Allen 2003, p. 135.
43 Allen et al. 2006.
44 Browder et al. 1995.
46 Wirth 1938.
47 Arif et al. 2019, p. 41.
48 CSA 2013.
49 CSA 2013; UNDESA 2018.
50 UNDESA 2018; Terfa et al. 2019.
51 Arif et al. 2019.
52 Creswell 2007.
56 MWUD, 2006.
58 FGD. Bēlajig-Dabirqa, Gondar (March 2017).
59 FGD. Belajig-Dabirqa, Gondar (March 2017).
62 Proc. 455/2005 (Article 4(2)).
65 IDI. Zenzelima, Bahir Dar (April 2017).
67 Adam 2014a.
68 FGD. Addis Alem, Bahir Dar (March 2017).
69 See Stebek 2013.
71 Adam 2014b.
72 FGD. Titfa, Dessie (March 2017).
73 Adam 2014a.
74 Adam 2014b.
75 See Alan and Ward 1985; Kironde 2000; Angel et al. 1983; Adam 2014a, 2014b
76 IDI. Azezo TekleHaymanot, Gondar (April 2017).
77 Adam 2014b, 2016.
78 See Fourie, 2004; Nkwae, 2006; Adam 2014a.
80 FGD. Azezo TekleHaymanot, Gondar (March 2017).
81 Proc. 455/2005 (Article 8(1)).
82 FGD. Zenzelima, Bahir Dar (March 2017); FGD. Addis Alem, Bahir Dar (March 2017); FGD. Belajig-Dabirqa, Gondar (March 2017).
83 See van Dijk 2009; Adam 2011; Tura 2018; Wubneh 2018.
84 FGD. Bēlajig-Dabirqa, Gondar (March 2017).
86 The City Alliance 2007, p. 3.
87 The 1995 FDRE Constitution (Article 92).
88 UN-Habitat 2008.
89 Mandere et. al. 2010.
90 IDI. Azezo TekleHaymanot, Gondar (April 2017).
91 IDI. Azezo TekleHaymanot, Gondar (April 2017).
92 IDI. Azezo TekleHaymanot, Gondar (April 2017).
94 IDI. Azezo TekleHaymanot, Gondar (April 2017).